Jiujiuqiu: Guan Yihong's journey from a Haikou noodle shop to Hong Kong's top pickled cabbage fish stock, struggling to survive after a 90% market value evaporation
Founded: Guan Yihong (Born in 1969, native of Taiyuan, Shanxi) · Jiujiuqiu International Holdings Limited (09922.HK)
Key Fields
FIELD STAMPSOrigin
In 1995, 26-year-old Guan Yihong from Taiyuan, Shanxi, traveled south to Haikou with his wife to start a business, opening a small noodle shop named Shanxi Mianwang. It was only 57 square meters with 6 tables and 6 employees. Guan himself was not a trained chef—jokingly dubbed by the industry as the chef who knows least about cooking—yet he established a foothold in Haikou through his hand-pulled Shanxi noodle craftsmanship and people-friendly prices. In 1995, he decided to expand the noodle business to Guangzhou, opening the first Shanxi Old Noodle Shop at the Guangzhou Racecourse, officially entering the South China catering market—a decision that later proved to be a critical turning point in Jiujiuqiu's destiny.
Milestones
Turning Points
- In 2002, Guan Yihong shifted from Haikou to Guangzhou, moving from a regional noodle shop to the South China shopping mall fast-casual dining track, marking the first critical leap for Jiujiuqiu from a small noodle shop to chain operations.
- In 2015, the incubation of Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish entered a niche track with the positioning that pickled cabbage tastes better than fish and unconventional marketing personas. Tai Er's table turnover rate soared from 3.6 to 4.9 times, completely altering Jiujiuqiu's destiny trajectory.
- In 2018, withdrawing from A-shares and moving to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, followed by a 56% surge on its 2020 listing day with market value exceeding HK$13.7 billion, benchmarked by the market as the second Haidilao—though capital fervor masked the vulnerability of single-brand dependence.
- In 2024, after the comprehensive failure of the multi-brand matrix, opening franchises and purging sub-brands, Guan Yihong publicly apologized and admitted to losing touch with the market, marking the beginning of the internet-famous bubble bursting.
- In 2025, acquiring Canada's Big Way Hot Pot to test overseas markets while overhauling Tai Er stores to introduce Sichuan cuisine and barbecue formats, Jiujiuqiu attempted to transform from a single pickled cabbage fish brand into a multi-category dining platform.
Failures & Pitfalls
- The failed first A-share attempt in 2016, following which previously incubated sub-brands like Paohu Beef Brisket (closing 4 of 6 stores), Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant all performed poorly and were forced to close or transfer, forcing a helpless withdrawal of the IPO application two years later.
- The comprehensive failure of the multi-brand matrix strategy: Na Wei Uncle is a Chef suspended operations in 2024, Lai Meili was transferred, and Paohu Beef Brisket, Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant were already closed or transferred—Jiujiuqiu tried at least 7 sub-brands, with only Tai Er and Song Hot Pot ultimately surviving.
- In the first half of 2024, adjusted net profit plummeted 68.88%, and Guan Yihong publicly apologized at an earnings conference, stating he had lost touch with the market, while promotions and price cuts in the first half had minimal effect.
- Opening franchises in 2024 with an excessively high threshold (requiring 3 million yuan in cash or 20 million yuan in assets), resulting in only 5 franchise stores opened in the first half of the year, making a negligible contribution to expansion.
- Closing 78 stores in the first half of 2025, with Tai Er's table turnover rate dropping from 3.5 to 3.1 times, full-year net profit falling 87.69% year-over-year, and market value evaporating over 90% from its HK$58.2 billion peak to about HK$4 billion.
- Tai Er fell into prefabricated food controversies; despite emphasizing live fish cooked to order, core ingredients like fish slices and pickled cabbage were centrally distributed by a central kitchen, leading consumers to bluntly state that paying hundreds of yuan for prefabricated food offers too little value.
- In 2025, a Beijing store was penalized by market regulators for anionic synthetic detergent detected on chopsticks, and multiple netizens exposed foreign objects found in pickled cabbage fish and non-fresh ingredients.
关键成功要素
- Standardized operations of Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish serve as the core barrier: ranking third in Chinese fast-casual dining and holding a 5.2% market share in South China, controlling output consistency through central kitchen unified distribution.
- Unconventional marketing personas (no parties over four, no extra spice and no takeout, pickled cabbage better than fish) ignited brand heat on social media at ultra-low costs, with Tai Er's table turnover rate once reaching 4.9 times, far exceeding the industry average.
- Shopping mall site selection strategy—pioneering the shift to shopping mall fast-casual dining in 2010, riding the coattails of China's commercial real estate golden cycle.
- The 2020 HKEX listing raised net proceeds of approximately HK$1.837 billion, of which HK$1.54 billion was used to expand the restaurant network, providing financial ammunition for Tai Er to scale from 98 to over 600 stores.
Lessons
- Internet-famous effects can quickly popularize a brand but cannot sustain long-term survival—Tai Er went from queuing for two hours to finishing a meal and shopping within an hour; once traffic ebbs, supply chain and basic service become the true moats.
- Single-brand dependence (Tai Er accounting for 73% of revenue) is both the sweetest and most dangerous trap: once Tai Er's table turnover rate declines, the group's performance and market value collapse accordingly.
- A multi-brand matrix cannot be successfully incubated simply by wanting to—Jiujiuqiu tried at least 7 sub-brands with only Tai Er and Song Hot Pot surviving, proving new brands require independent supply chains and a sufficiently long patience period.
- Franchising is not a universal cure: opening franchises when direct operations hit bottlenecks, but setting the threshold too high resulted in only 5 franchise stores in the first half of the year, solving neither expansion nor capital issues.
- Capital market benchmark narratives (the second Haidilao) ultimately revert to operational fundamentals: the peak market value of HK$58.2 billion was built on the optimistic assumption of a 4.9-time table turnover rate for Tai Er; once turnover fell below 3.5 times, the valuation logic completely disintegrated.
- Guan Yihong's own summarized lesson is the most precise—losing touch with the market: when consumers shifted from young people to family diners, and from chasing internet-famous experiences to pursuing value for money, Tai Er's positioning failed to adjust in time.
Core Data
- 上市首日市值:HK$13.761 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 上市超额认购倍数:636x (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 上市融资净额:Approx. HK$1.837 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2021年2月峰值市值:HK$58.2 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2024年全年营收:6.074 billion yuan (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2024年全年净利润:55.807 million yuan (down 87.69% YoY) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2024年上半年营收:3.064 billion yuan (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2024年上半年经调整纯利:0.77 billion yuan (down 68.88% YoY) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 太二翻台率2018年巅峰:4.9 times per day (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 太二翻台率2025年:3.1 times per day (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 太二2024上半年人均消费:71 yuan (fell below 70 for the first time in nearly seven years) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 太二门店数2024年末:634 stores (547 self-operated and 19 franchised) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 太二门店数2025年中:566 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 怂火锅门店数2025年中:76 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 九毛九西北菜门店数2025年中:68 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2025年上半年关店数:78 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 2025年7月市值:Approx. HK$4 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
- 市值蒸发幅度:Over 90% (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
Competitors / Peers
The Chinese fast-casual dining track is highly competitive and fragmented. In 2018, based on major brand revenue, Jiujiuqiu ranked third among Chinese fast-casual dining companies, accounting for approximately 1.0% of the market share and ranking first in South China with a 5.2% market share. Direct competitors include Haidilao (hot pot giant with 2024 revenue exceeding 40 billion), Xibei Youmiancun (direct competitor in the Northwest cuisine track), Green Tea Group (gross profit margin close to 69%, far surpassing Jiujiuqiu), and Xiaocaiyuan (gross profit margin exceeding 65% at the time of prospectus). The niche pickled cabbage fish track features regional players like Yao Pickled Cabbage Fish and Yanchu Laotan Pickled Cabbage Fish. In 2024, a full-scale restaurant price war erupted, and Tai Er's per capita consumption fell below 70 yuan for the first time, while competitors simultaneously cut prices, plunging the entire industry into a dual dilemma of declining customer unit prices and falling table turnover rates.