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Jiujiuqiu: Guan Yihong's journey from a Haikou noodle shop to Hong Kong's top pickled cabbage fish stock, struggling to survive after a 90% market value evaporation

Founded: Guan Yihong (Born in 1969, native of Taiyuan, Shanxi) · Jiujiuqiu International Holdings Limited (09922.HK)

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther

Origin

In 1995, 26-year-old Guan Yihong from Taiyuan, Shanxi, traveled south to Haikou with his wife to start a business, opening a small noodle shop named Shanxi Mianwang. It was only 57 square meters with 6 tables and 6 employees. Guan himself was not a trained chef—jokingly dubbed by the industry as the chef who knows least about cooking—yet he established a foothold in Haikou through his hand-pulled Shanxi noodle craftsmanship and people-friendly prices. In 1995, he decided to expand the noodle business to Guangzhou, opening the first Shanxi Old Noodle Shop at the Guangzhou Racecourse, officially entering the South China catering market—a decision that later proved to be a critical turning point in Jiujiuqiu's destiny.

Milestones

1995
Opening in Haikou Growth
26-year-old Guan Yihong opened a 57-square-meter Shanxi noodle shop called Shanxi Mianwang in Haikou, with only 6 tables and 6 employees. Not a cook himself, he relied on his wife and hired noodle masters to make hand-pulled noodles, gradually securing a foothold in Haikou through accessible pricing and Northwest flavors.
2002
Expanding to Guangzhou Turning Point
Guan Yihong expanded the noodle business from Haikou to Guangzhou, opening the first Shanxi Old Noodle Shop at the Guangzhou Racecourse. Upon entering the South China market, he realized the limited ceiling of traditional street-side shops and began researching the potential of shopping mall catering, laying the groundwork for his future transition into fast-casual dining.
2010
Fast-Casual Transition PMF
Jiujiuqiu opened its first batch of Jiujiuqiu restaurants in South China shopping malls, shifting from a traditional street-side noodle shop to a fast-casual dining operator. The brand positioned itself around youthful, high-value Northwest cuisine, concentrating locations in shopping malls and expanding rapidly by leveraging the commercial real estate dividend period, eventually surpassing 100 stores in the Guangdong region.
2015
Incubating Tai Er Turning Point
In 2015, an experience eating pickled cabbage fish inspired Guan Yihong to incubate a new brand with a style completely distinct from Jiujiuqiu—Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish. The first Tai Er opened in Guangzhou, featuring a differentiated positioning that pickled cabbage tastes better than the fish, paired with unconventional marketing personas such as not serving parties of more than four, and refusing requests for extra spice or takeout. It quickly exploded on social media and became an internet-famous brand. Tai Er's table turnover rate surged from 3.6 times in 2016 to 4.9 times in 2018, far exceeding the industry average.
2016
First A-share Attempt Failure
In 2016, Jiujiuqiu submitted its A-share prospectus to the China Securities Regulatory Commission, planning to raise approximately 313 million yuan for new store openings and upgrades. However, prolonged A-share review processes, uncertain listing timelines, and the poor performance of simultaneously incubated sub-brands like Paohu Beef Brisket (closing 4 out of 6 stores), Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant—all of which were forced to close or be transferred—cast a shadow over the prospectus. Two years later in 2018, Jiujiuqiu ultimately withdrew its A-share listing application.
2020
HKEX Listing Growth
On January 15, 2020, Jiujiuqiu debuted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (09922.HK) at an offering price of HK$6.6 per share. On its first day, it surged 56.36% to close at HK$10.32, with its market value exceeding HK$13.76 billion, and the Hong Kong public offering recorded a 636-fold oversubscription. The listing created nearly 10 billionaires, and founder Guan Yihong's net worth approached HK$8 billion, with the market benchmarking it as the next Haidilao.
2021
Market Value Peak Growth
In February 2021, Jiujiuqiu's market value climbed to a peak of HK$58.2 billion, quadrupling its first-day listing value. Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish stores expanded rapidly from 98 at the time of listing to over 600, becoming the group's absolute flagship brand and contributing over 73% of revenue. Amid capital fervor, Jiujiuqiu began incubating multiple sub-brands such as Song Hot Pot, Lai Meili Pickled Pepper Grilled Fish, Na Wei Uncle is a Chef, and Mountain Outside Mountain Guizhou Sour Soup Hot Pot, attempting to build a multi-brand matrix.
2024
Sub-brand Purge Failure
In the first half of 2024, Jiujiuqiu's adjusted net profit plummeted 68.88% year-over-year to 77 million yuan. Guan Yihong made a rare public apology at an earnings conference: 'We are very sorry, as we lost touch with the market and made mistakes in our response measures.' In April of that year, Na Wei Uncle is a Chef announced suspension of operations; the growing Lai Meili was transferred to an independent third party; and Paohu Beef Brisket, Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant had all been previously closed or transferred. The multi-brand matrix strategy was effectively declared a failure.
2024
Opening Franchises Turning Point
In early 2024, Jiujiuqiu high-profile announced the opening of franchises, but the franchise threshold was extremely high: requiring proof of over 3 million yuan in cash or 20 million yuan in liquid assets, 3 to 5 years of experience in renowned commercial projects, and 5 to 15 stores of management experience. Only 5 franchise stores opened in the first half of the year, making a negligible contribution to expansion and serving essentially as a forced pivot after direct-operation model bottlenecks.
2025
Cliff-like Store Closures Failure
In 2025, stores dropped sharply from 807 at the beginning of the year to 729 by the end of the second quarter, closing 78 stores in half a year and shrinking scale back to end-2023 levels. Tai Er's table turnover rate dropped from 3.5 to 3.1 times, and same-store daily sales fell 13.7%. Full-year 2024 net profit was only 55.807 million yuan, down 87.69% year-over-year. Market value plunged over 90% from its peak of HK$58.2 billion to about HK$4 billion. Food safety issues (detergent detected on chopsticks at a Beijing store), prefabricated food controversies, and a cliff-like drop in service quality followed one after another.
2025
Overhaul and Going Global Turning Point
In 2025, Jiujiuqiu launched self-rescue efforts: Tai Er stores underwent a wild overhaul, introducing Sichuan cuisine formats and a new barbecue track brand, Chaozhibian. In July, it acquired a 10% stake in Canada's Big Way Hot Pot to test the North American market; in 2026, it plans to complete the adjustment and modification of all Tai Er stores in the mainland while evaluating the overseas feasibility of Song Hot Pot. This is a difficult pivot returning from an internet-famous brand back to the fundamentals.

Turning Points

  • In 2002, Guan Yihong shifted from Haikou to Guangzhou, moving from a regional noodle shop to the South China shopping mall fast-casual dining track, marking the first critical leap for Jiujiuqiu from a small noodle shop to chain operations.
  • In 2015, the incubation of Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish entered a niche track with the positioning that pickled cabbage tastes better than fish and unconventional marketing personas. Tai Er's table turnover rate soared from 3.6 to 4.9 times, completely altering Jiujiuqiu's destiny trajectory.
  • In 2018, withdrawing from A-shares and moving to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, followed by a 56% surge on its 2020 listing day with market value exceeding HK$13.7 billion, benchmarked by the market as the second Haidilao—though capital fervor masked the vulnerability of single-brand dependence.
  • In 2024, after the comprehensive failure of the multi-brand matrix, opening franchises and purging sub-brands, Guan Yihong publicly apologized and admitted to losing touch with the market, marking the beginning of the internet-famous bubble bursting.
  • In 2025, acquiring Canada's Big Way Hot Pot to test overseas markets while overhauling Tai Er stores to introduce Sichuan cuisine and barbecue formats, Jiujiuqiu attempted to transform from a single pickled cabbage fish brand into a multi-category dining platform.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • The failed first A-share attempt in 2016, following which previously incubated sub-brands like Paohu Beef Brisket (closing 4 of 6 stores), Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant all performed poorly and were forced to close or transfer, forcing a helpless withdrawal of the IPO application two years later.
  • The comprehensive failure of the multi-brand matrix strategy: Na Wei Uncle is a Chef suspended operations in 2024, Lai Meili was transferred, and Paohu Beef Brisket, Coconut Yutang, and Liezui Restaurant were already closed or transferred—Jiujiuqiu tried at least 7 sub-brands, with only Tai Er and Song Hot Pot ultimately surviving.
  • In the first half of 2024, adjusted net profit plummeted 68.88%, and Guan Yihong publicly apologized at an earnings conference, stating he had lost touch with the market, while promotions and price cuts in the first half had minimal effect.
  • Opening franchises in 2024 with an excessively high threshold (requiring 3 million yuan in cash or 20 million yuan in assets), resulting in only 5 franchise stores opened in the first half of the year, making a negligible contribution to expansion.
  • Closing 78 stores in the first half of 2025, with Tai Er's table turnover rate dropping from 3.5 to 3.1 times, full-year net profit falling 87.69% year-over-year, and market value evaporating over 90% from its HK$58.2 billion peak to about HK$4 billion.
  • Tai Er fell into prefabricated food controversies; despite emphasizing live fish cooked to order, core ingredients like fish slices and pickled cabbage were centrally distributed by a central kitchen, leading consumers to bluntly state that paying hundreds of yuan for prefabricated food offers too little value.
  • In 2025, a Beijing store was penalized by market regulators for anionic synthetic detergent detected on chopsticks, and multiple netizens exposed foreign objects found in pickled cabbage fish and non-fresh ingredients.

关键成功要素

  • Standardized operations of Tai Er Pickled Cabbage Fish serve as the core barrier: ranking third in Chinese fast-casual dining and holding a 5.2% market share in South China, controlling output consistency through central kitchen unified distribution.
  • Unconventional marketing personas (no parties over four, no extra spice and no takeout, pickled cabbage better than fish) ignited brand heat on social media at ultra-low costs, with Tai Er's table turnover rate once reaching 4.9 times, far exceeding the industry average.
  • Shopping mall site selection strategy—pioneering the shift to shopping mall fast-casual dining in 2010, riding the coattails of China's commercial real estate golden cycle.
  • The 2020 HKEX listing raised net proceeds of approximately HK$1.837 billion, of which HK$1.54 billion was used to expand the restaurant network, providing financial ammunition for Tai Er to scale from 98 to over 600 stores.

Lessons

  • Internet-famous effects can quickly popularize a brand but cannot sustain long-term survival—Tai Er went from queuing for two hours to finishing a meal and shopping within an hour; once traffic ebbs, supply chain and basic service become the true moats.
  • Single-brand dependence (Tai Er accounting for 73% of revenue) is both the sweetest and most dangerous trap: once Tai Er's table turnover rate declines, the group's performance and market value collapse accordingly.
  • A multi-brand matrix cannot be successfully incubated simply by wanting to—Jiujiuqiu tried at least 7 sub-brands with only Tai Er and Song Hot Pot surviving, proving new brands require independent supply chains and a sufficiently long patience period.
  • Franchising is not a universal cure: opening franchises when direct operations hit bottlenecks, but setting the threshold too high resulted in only 5 franchise stores in the first half of the year, solving neither expansion nor capital issues.
  • Capital market benchmark narratives (the second Haidilao) ultimately revert to operational fundamentals: the peak market value of HK$58.2 billion was built on the optimistic assumption of a 4.9-time table turnover rate for Tai Er; once turnover fell below 3.5 times, the valuation logic completely disintegrated.
  • Guan Yihong's own summarized lesson is the most precise—losing touch with the market: when consumers shifted from young people to family diners, and from chasing internet-famous experiences to pursuing value for money, Tai Er's positioning failed to adjust in time.

Core Data

  • 上市首日市值:HK$13.761 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 上市超额认购倍数:636x (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 上市融资净额:Approx. HK$1.837 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2021年2月峰值市值:HK$58.2 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2024年全年营收:6.074 billion yuan (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2024年全年净利润:55.807 million yuan (down 87.69% YoY) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2024年上半年营收:3.064 billion yuan (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2024年上半年经调整纯利:0.77 billion yuan (down 68.88% YoY) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 太二翻台率2018年巅峰:4.9 times per day (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 太二翻台率2025年:3.1 times per day (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 太二2024上半年人均消费:71 yuan (fell below 70 for the first time in nearly seven years) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 太二门店数2024年末:634 stores (547 self-operated and 19 franchised) (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 太二门店数2025年中:566 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 怂火锅门店数2025年中:76 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 九毛九西北菜门店数2025年中:68 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2025年上半年关店数:78 stores (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 2025年7月市值:Approx. HK$4 billion (publicly available data, independent review not verified)
  • 市值蒸发幅度:Over 90% (publicly available data, independent review not verified)

Competitors / Peers

The Chinese fast-casual dining track is highly competitive and fragmented. In 2018, based on major brand revenue, Jiujiuqiu ranked third among Chinese fast-casual dining companies, accounting for approximately 1.0% of the market share and ranking first in South China with a 5.2% market share. Direct competitors include Haidilao (hot pot giant with 2024 revenue exceeding 40 billion), Xibei Youmiancun (direct competitor in the Northwest cuisine track), Green Tea Group (gross profit margin close to 69%, far surpassing Jiujiuqiu), and Xiaocaiyuan (gross profit margin exceeding 65% at the time of prospectus). The niche pickled cabbage fish track features regional players like Yao Pickled Cabbage Fish and Yanchu Laotan Pickled Cabbage Fish. In 2024, a full-scale restaurant price war erupted, and Tai Er's per capita consumption fell below 70 yuan for the first time, while competitors simultaneously cut prices, plunging the entire industry into a dual dilemma of declining customer unit prices and falling table turnover rates.