Food & BeverageChina
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JOURNEY · DETAIL
Juewei Food: The Rise and Fall from a Duck Neck Stall to a 10,000-Store Giant and its ST Status
Founded: Dai Wenjun · Juewei Food Co., Ltd.
JOURNEY
Key Fields
FIELD STAMPSIndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther
Origin
In 2005, Dai Wenjun, with a background in marketing, keenly identified the trend of braised food shifting from dining table side dishes to casual snacks, and opened the first Juewei Duck Neck store in Changsha, Hunan. He abandoned the conservative approach of traditional braised food, implemented standardized production and a bulk-weighing sales model. Leveraging strong channel execution, he quickly validated the single-store model, laying the foundation for subsequent large-scale franchise expansion.
Milestones
2005
Inception PMF
In 2005, Dai Wenjun identified the trend of braised food shifting from dining table side dishes to casual snacks and opened the first Juewei Duck Neck store in Changsha. By combining traditional braising techniques with standardized production and a bulk-weighing sales model, he quickly built a local customer base through the addictive spicy flavor and validated the single-store profitability model, establishing the product foundation for franchise expansion.
2007
Franchise Expansion Growth
Juewei established a channel strategy led by direct operations and dominated by franchises, supporting the network through wholly-owned subsidiaries and cold-chain production bases across regions. By 2014, the number of stores exceeded 5,000, and revenue reached 2.63 billion RMB. Relying on large-scale cold chain and a dense franchise network, it built an early channel moat and maintained a leading market share from 2007 to 2014.
2017
Capitalization Turning Point
In 2017, Juewei Food listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, raising approximately 540 million RMB in net proceeds, becoming the first 'duck neck stock.' However, the rush of capitalization masked the weakness in same-store growth. To satisfy the capital market's hunger for growth, Juewei launched aggressive store expansion and cross-industry investments, spending 1.8 billion RMB to invest in dozens of companies like HeFu Noodle and Qianwei Yangchu, planting the seeds for financial compliance issues and capital pressure.
2021
Peak and Crisis Shift
Juewei's store count exceeded 15,000, topping the braised food sector with a market value peaking near 50 billion RMB. However, hit by weak macro consumption and soaring raw material costs for duck by-products, the gross margin fell continuously from over 33% to around 25%. Meanwhile, snack discount stores swept the lower-tier markets with extreme cost-effectiveness, causing high-priced duck necks to face competition from cheaper alternatives. Same-store sales shrank significantly, and the 10,000-store scale became a massive cost burden from 2021 to 2023.
2025
First Loss and Turnaround Failure
Juewei Food reported its first loss in 9 years since listing and was subjected to ST treatment due to financial compliance issues. Over 5,000 stores were closed in two years, an average of 8 stores per day, and its market value plummeted by over 55 billion RMB from its peak. In 2026, the company was forced to overhaul its stores, adding freshly cooked dishes like pig head meat and beef to counter the impact of snack discount stores, but consumer perception had already solidified, and the transformation yielded minimal results from 2025 to 2026.
Turning Points
- In 2005, Dai Wenjun opened the first bulk-braised food store focusing on duck necks in Changsha, establishing the single-store model of standardized production and weighing sales.
- In 2017, Juewei successfully listed on the SSE, raising 540 million RMB, and entered an era of aggressive cross-industry investment and franchise expansion fueled by capital.
- Starting in 2023, snack discount stores swept the lower-tier markets with extreme low prices, causing a disruptive 'dimensionality reduction' hit to the product logic of Juewei's high-priced duck necks.
- In 2025, the company was marked as ST due to financial compliance issues and recorded its first loss in 9 years, closing over 5,000 stores in two years and being forced into product category transformation for survival.
Failures & Pitfalls
- Blindly expanding to over 15,000 stores to meet capital market growth expectations led to a scale backlash when same-store revenue declined during the consumption downgrade, resulting in an average of 8 store closures per day.
- Spending 1.8 billion RMB on cross-industry investments in companies like HeFu Noodle failed to create synergies with the core business, instead causing financial statement confusion and leading to ST treatment due to compliance issues.
- Failing to lower prices in time to respond to the rise of snack discount stores and sticking to high-margin duck neck products caused the company to miss the best window for defending the lower-tier market.
- Attempting to renovate stores in 2026 with hot-chain products like pig head meat and bone meal failed to reverse the decline in same-store sales due to slow supply chain adjustments and solidified customer perceptions.
关键成功要素
- Dai Wenjun reshaped traditional braised food with a marketing mindset, transforming duck necks from dining table side dishes into high-frequency casual snacks and validating the single-store model.
- Relying on wholly-owned provincial subsidiaries and cold-chain distribution centers, the company built an underlying supply chain network that supported high turnover for 10,000 franchise stores.
- Aggressive franchise expansion brought the number one market share during the industry's growth phase, but it directly converted into high fixed costs and uncontrollable closure rates during the consumption downgrade.
- Blind cross-industry food investments failed to realize market expectations and led to severe financial compliance scandals and an ST crisis.
Lessons
- The essence of large-scale franchising is the replication of a single-store profitability model; once that model is broken by macro cycles, the 10,000-store network instantly becomes the heaviest liability.
- Brand and category moats are fragile; snack discount stores easily pierced brand premiums through supply chain flattening, dissolving the channel advantages accumulated by traditional braised food brands.
- Cross-industry investments after listing, if lacking strategic synergy with the core business, easily evolve into toxic assets that drag down cash flow and financial compliance.
- Forced product line changes for survival during a consumption downgrade cycle often face the dual risks of customer rejection and excessively high supply chain restructuring costs.
Core Data
- Peak Store Count：Over 15,000 (2021 peak) (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- Market Value Loss：Plummeted by approximately 55 billion RMB from peak (as of 2026) (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- Store Closures：Over 5,000 closed in two years (2024-2025) (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- Year of First Loss：2025, first loss in 9 years since listing (Based on public data)
- Total Cross-industry Investment：Approximately 1.8 billion RMB (invested in HeFu Noodle, etc.) (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- 2014 Revenue：2.63 billion RMB (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- Net IPO Proceeds：Approximately 540 million RMB (2017) (Based on public data, independent verification not performed)
Competitors / Peers
Juewei Food faces a dual attack from peers and cross-industry competitors in the braised food sector. Among peers, Zhou Hei Ya maintains brand premiums through direct operations in high-end commercial districts and modified atmosphere packaging, while Huangshanghuang relies on franchises but has certain barriers in deep-processed dining side dishes. However, the truly devastating blow comes from the 'dimensionality reduction' of the snack discount track. Brands like 'Snack is Busy' (Ling Shi Hen Mang) and Zhao Yiming have cut the price of bulk duck necks in half compared to Juewei through supply chain flattening, while their full-category snack matrix intercepts younger customers. Facing the price-cutting knives of discount stores, Juewei's painstakingly managed 10,000-store scale and high-margin product logic have both failed, leaving the company trapped in a dilemma of a race to the bottom.