Food & BeverageChina
← Sticker Wall
JOURNEY · DETAIL
Chi Forest: From Gaming Veteran to Sugar-Free Sparkling Water Sensation, Targeting HK IPO After 2022 Setback
Founded: Tang Binsen · Chi Forest (Beijing) Food Technology Group Co., Ltd. (formerly known as Genki Forest)
JOURNEY
Key Fields
FIELD STAMPSIndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther
Origin
Tang Binsen is a veteran of the gaming industry's global expansion. Born in Hefei, Anhui in 1982, he won a gold medal in an international programming contest after graduating from Beihang University. He subsequently founded Elex Tech, earning his first fortune in the overseas mobile game market with clones of FarmVille and the 2013 launch of 'Clash of Kings,' which saw over 65 million global downloads in its first year. In 2014, Elex Tech was acquired by Chinese Universe Publishing and Media for approximately 2.66 billion RMB. Although he could have continued in gaming, he felt constrained by the duopoly of Tencent and NetEase in the domestic market. Convinced that 'the internet has been carved up by giants, while the beverage industry remains stuck in the previous era,' he pivoted to beverages in 2016, applying a data-driven mindset from gaming. He bet that the shift toward sugar-free, healthy lifestyles was a long-term consumer migration rather than a passing fad.
Milestones
2008
Gaming Global Expansion PMF
Tang Binsen developed social mobile games like Happy Farmer, Happy Farm, and Clash of Kings at Elex Tech. Clash of Kings, developed by Elex Tech and launched in April 2013, achieved over 65 million global downloads in its first year, consistently ranking at the top of App Store and Google Play revenue charts, and operated cross-platform on Facebook. This was his first successful execution of a 'Chinese R&D + Global Distribution' product-market fit, providing the capital and methodological framework for his future cross-industry move. This phase lasted from 2008 to 2014.
2016
Founding Chi Forest Turning Point
Following the acquisition of Elex Tech by Chinese Universe Publishing and Media in 2014, Tang officially resigned as CEO of Elex Tech in June 2020 to focus entirely on his new venture. He founded Chi Forest (Beijing) Food Technology Group in 2016, positioning it as a sugar-free, low-calorie beverage brand. The team had almost no experience in FMCG, and the company was initially sustained by capital injections from his own Challenger Capital.
2016
Initial Failures Failure
The first batch of product formulations and OEM production failed completely, forcing the company to spend money to destroy the entire inventory to protect the brand. The company survived on loans from Challenger Capital, nearly dying before it even entered the beverage industry. This experience taught the team that FMCG is a 'slow business' where channels and production capacity are the true moats, rather than internet-style user acquisition. This phase lasted from 2016 to 2017.
2017
Launch of Ran Tea PMF
Using initial funding raised through Weibo crowdfunding, the team launched 'Ran Tea,' a low-calorie, low-sugar oolong tea. This was the first time the team found a prototype for a hit product that consumers accepted. After the success of Ran Tea, '0 Sucrose, Low Sugar, Low Calorie' became the core narrative for the entire product line, laying the conceptual foundation for later sparkling water hits.
2018
Sparkling Water Boom Growth
Entering the carbonated beverage market in 2018, the company leveraged erythritol, Japanese-style packaging, and convenience store channels to make its '0 Sugar, 0 Fat, 0 Calorie' sparkling water a massive hit. In 2020, sales reached approximately 3 billion RMB, a year-on-year increase of 309%, making it the fastest-growing company in the domestic beverage industry. In May of the same year, it launched the energy drink brand 'Alien,' opened its first self-built factory in Chuzhou, Anhui in July, and hired former ByteDance VP Liu Zhen in December to lead overseas business. The company surged to unicorn valuation. This phase lasted from 2018 to 2020.
2021
Labeling Controversy Failure
In January 2021, the company signed Jackson Yee as a spokesperson, pushing its Japanese-style marketing to its peak. However, in April, consumers and media questioned why '0 Sucrose' was being conflated with '0 Sugar,' forcing the company to issue a public apology. Milk tea packaging was changed from '0 Sucrose, Low Fat' to 'Low Sugar, Low Fat,' and milk tea produced after March 20 no longer contained crystalline fructose. On October 26, an employee error led to sparkling water priced at 79 RMB per case being sold for 3.5 RMB, resulting in 300,000 orders in a single night. The combination of the '0 Sucrose' naming controversy and the pricing error put immense pressure on brand trust and channel inventory. In 2022, sales fell significantly below expectations, and Chi Forest fell from its pedestal as the market turned against it.
2022
De-Japanization Adjustment Turning Point
The company changed the Japanese kanji '気' on its logo and packaging back to the simplified Chinese '气' and removed the phrase 'Produced under the supervision of Genki Forest Co., Ltd. (Japan).' In January 2023, it exited the shareholder list of Beihai Ranch. That same month, the former head of the marketing center was detained by police for alleged major corruption, which the company used as an opportunity to overhaul its channel and distribution system. Simultaneously, it accelerated the construction of its own factories to reduce reliance on OEMs and regained growth through 'Alien' electrolyte water in convenience stores, recalibrating from an internet-famous beverage company into a serious FMCG player. This phase lasted from 2022 to 2024.
2026
Sprinting to HK IPO Growth
According to public reports in January 2026, Chi Forest is considering an IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with investors including Warburg Pincus and Temasek. Facing pressure from Nongfu Spring, Coca-Cola, and new domestic tea brands, the company must evolve from an internet-famous brand into a serious FMCG giant—a true test for Tang Binsen ten years after his cross-industry pivot.
Turning Points
- Pivot from gaming to beverages: Convinced that FMCG is better suited for new players than the internet, bringing channel distribution strategies from gaming into the beverage industry.
- Ran Tea crowdfunding launch: Found the first mass-producible hit prototype and established '0 Sucrose, Low Sugar, Low Calorie' as the core narrative for the entire brand.
- 0 Sucrose controversy and de-Japanization: Forced to shed its Japanese-style packaging and marketing aura, returning to focus on product and channel fundamentals.
Failures & Pitfalls
- First batch of products failed completely and had to be destroyed; survived on loans from Challenger Capital, nearly dying before entering the industry.
- Misleading '0 Sucrose' labeling led to consumer backlash, a public apology, and a forced change in product formulation, severely damaging brand trust.
- Operational accident where an employee mispriced 79 RMB sparkling water at 3.5 RMB, resulting in 300,000 orders in one night, exposing weak internal controls.
- Over-expansion of channels led to a collapse in inventory and pricing in 2022, with sales falling far below expectations, causing the company to fall from its unicorn status.
关键成功要素
- Data-driven mindset from gaming: Treating channels like user acquisition and convenience store shelves like ad placements, re-engineering the beverage industry with internet tactics.
- Erythritol as a sugar substitute tapped into the long-term consumer shift toward sugar-free health, rather than a temporary trend.
- Self-built factories in Chuzhou and other locations since 2020: Shifting from OEM to controllable production capacity to regain control over quality and margins.
- Early capital injections from Challenger Capital provided the space for trial and error, allowing the cross-industry team to fail repeatedly until they perfected Ran Tea.
Lessons
- The subtle difference between '0 Sucrose' and '0 Sugar' can backfire on brand trust; marketing claims must not outpace product facts.
- Cross-industry entrepreneurs must abandon the arrogance of 'internet speed'; beverages are a slow business where channels are king, and there are no shortcuts.
- Self-built production capacity is a prerequisite for an internet-famous beverage company to become a serious FMCG player; the OEM model leaves quality and margins vulnerable.
- A single operational accident (like a pricing error) can severely damage a new consumer brand; internal controls and error-proofing are more important than imagined.
Core Data
- 2014 Elex Tech acquisition price：Approx. 2.66 billion RMB (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- 2020 Chi Forest sales：Approx. 3 billion RMB (309% YoY increase) (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- 2021 operational error order volume：Approx. 300,000 orders (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
- 2026 IPO rumors exchange：Hong Kong Stock Exchange (media estimate, independent verification not performed)
- Clash of Kings first-year downloads：Over 65 million (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
Competitors / Peers
In the sparkling water segment, the primary competitors are Nongfu Spring's soda sparkling water and Coca-Cola's Schweppes; the former has depth in channels and supply chain, while the latter has global brand power and capital. New tea beverage brands like Heytea and Nayuki are expanding into bottled drinks. In the energy drink segment, competitors include Red Bull and Eastroc Beverage. Regarding sugar-free narratives, the company must also fully distance itself from the Japanese brands it initially imitated. By 2026, its true opponent is not any single bottle of water, but how to transform an 'internet-famous brand' into a long-lasting FMCG player amidst channel and price wars.
Sources
- https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/元气森林
- https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/唐彬森
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genki_Forest
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Kings
- https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260326A08KP700
- https://www.caozhe.cn/6928
- https://m.36kr.com/p/2322824719197058
- https://www.jiemian.com/article/14621622.html
- https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/s0IuoMZSY5-pbarE5H-rLQ
- https://www.donews.com/article/detail/8260/101462.html