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Three Squirrels: A Case Study of Zhang Liaoyuan's Transformation from Nut IP E-commerce to Discount Snack Retail

Founded: Zhang Liaoyuan · Three Squirrels Inc.

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther

Origin

Zhang Liaoyuan spent years managing a local nut brand in Anhui. In 2012, he keenly captured the Taobao e-commerce boom, identifying that the nut category had moderate unit prices, strong logistics adaptability, and a lack of dominant online brands at the time, leading him to found Three Squirrels in Wuhu. He pioneered brand IP-fication, integrating anthropomorphic squirrel characters into packaging, customer service scripts, and user experiences. This differentiated emotional connection allowed the brand to quickly capture consumer mindshare in an unbranded market, riding the Taobao traffic wave to explosive growth.

Milestones

2012
Startup Phase PMF
Zhang Liaoyuan founded Three Squirrels in Wuhu, Anhui, securing approximately 15 million RMB in angel funding from Capital Today and IDG Capital. The Tmall flagship store launched the same year, introducing the 'Owner Culture' customer service system and anthropomorphic squirrel IP. The brand achieved 7.6 million RMB in sales during its first Double 11, ranking among the top in the nut category and validating the feasibility and power of IP-driven branding in e-commerce.
2013
Traffic Dividend Boom Growth
Leveraging the Taobao Double 11 traffic dividend and the rapid increase in online penetration for nuts, revenue exceeded 300 million RMB in 2013 and 1.1 billion RMB in 2014, with single-day Double 11 sales surpassing 100 million RMB for two consecutive years. By combining a standardized nut supply chain with IP-based operations, Zhang Liaoyuan quickly surpassed traditional nut brands to become the online category leader, completing Series B and C financing totaling over 300 million RMB between 2013 and 2014.
2015
Multi-round Financing and Category Expansion Growth
In 2015, the company raised 300 million RMB from investors including FreesFund, reaching a valuation of 4 billion RMB. Zhang Liaoyuan began expanding beyond nuts into snacks and maternal/infant products, while experimenting with offline 'feeding stores' and alliance shops. However, multi-category expansion increased management complexity; some new categories had significantly lower gross margins than the core nut business, and supply chain and quality control pressures emerged, planting the seeds for future food safety issues. This phase lasted through 2016.
2017
IPO Obstacles and Food Safety Crisis Failure
Three Squirrels submitted its first IPO application to the CSRC in March 2017, but the process was stalled due to frequent food safety issues, including multiple instances of mold and peroxide values exceeding standards in national market supervision inspections. Zhang later admitted that the quality control blind spots inherent in the OEM supply chain model were the core lesson. This crisis severely damaged brand trust and exposed the deep-seated risks of an asset-light OEM model.
2019
Listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (ChiNext) Turning Point
On July 12, 2019, Three Squirrels listed on the ChiNext board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Stock Code: 300783) at an issue price of 14.68 RMB/share. Following the listing, the stock hit the daily limit repeatedly, with market capitalization briefly exceeding 20 billion RMB. Zhang Liaoyuan’s personal stake exceeded 40%, making him the richest person in Anhui. However, starting in the second half of the year, online traffic dividends faded and customer acquisition costs climbed, forcing the company to face the immense pressure of transitioning from a pure online brand to an omni-channel player.
2020
Offline Expansion Failure and Revenue Decline Failure
Starting in 2020, Three Squirrels aggressively expanded its offline 'feeding stores' and alliance shops, planning for thousands of locations. However, poor site selection and operational capabilities led to widespread losses and store closures. 2022 revenue was approximately 7.29 billion RMB, a significant decline from the 2020 peak of approximately 9.8 billion RMB, with annual net profit shrinking sharply. Zhang launched an internal 'Rebirth' strategy, cutting low-efficiency categories and loss-making stores to return to the core nut business, admitting that the offline expansion was overly aggressive. This phase lasted from 2020 to 2022.
2023
Supply Chain Transformation and Discount Pivot Turning Point
Zhang Liaoyuan pushed for deep supply chain reforms, building self-owned nut factories to replace the pure OEM model, improving quality control and reducing costs. Simultaneously, the company entered the discount snack track, launching a community snack store model modeled after brands like 'Snack is Busy' (Ling Shi Hen Mang), attempting to use a low-price, high-frequency strategy to penetrate lower-tier markets. 2023 revenue was approximately 7.1 billion RMB; while not fully recovered, supply chain improvements gradually boosted gross margins, laying the foundation for a return to the 10 billion RMB mark.
2024
Revenue Returns to 10 Billion and Hong Kong Secondary Listing Turning Point
In 2024, Three Squirrels' revenue surpassed 10 billion RMB, returning to the 10 billion level after several years. In an interview with 36Kr, Zhang Liaoyuan candidly stated that 'the first success was just a series of lucky events,' arguing that the success from 2012 to 2019 relied on Taobao traffic dividends rather than true core competitiveness. The company initiated plans for a secondary listing in Hong Kong and announced a comprehensive pivot toward short-video live-streaming e-commerce and discount snack retail, aiming to become an 'awesome snack super-company'.

Turning Points

  • In 2012, Zhang Liaoyuan abandoned the traditional offline nut business to bet entirely on the Taobao e-commerce boom, using squirrel IP operations to build brand awareness in an untapped market.
  • In 2017, failed food safety inspections caused the first IPO attempt to falter, forcing Zhang to shift from a pure OEM model to a supply chain transformation path involving self-built factories.
  • After the 2019 IPO, during the peak of market capitalization, Zhang's overconfidence led to the rollout of thousands of offline stores, resulting in widespread losses and closures—a key event he later cited as proof that his 'first success was all luck'.
  • In 2022, after revenue fell below 10 billion, Zhang launched the 'Rebirth' strategy, cutting excessive categories and loss-making stores to refocus on the core nut business and enter the discount snack track.
  • In 2024, after revenue returned to 10 billion, the company pursued a secondary listing in Hong Kong while prioritizing short-video live-streaming e-commerce as its second growth curve.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • During the 2017 IPO, the application was withdrawn due to repeated failures in nut product inspections regarding mold and peroxide levels, exposing fundamental flaws in the pure OEM supply chain model.
  • The large-scale expansion of offline 'feeding stores' and alliance shops from 2020 to 2022 failed, with plans for thousands of stores resulting in massive losses and closures, directly causing a double decline in revenue and profit.
  • From 2015 to 2017, multi-category expansion exceeded supply chain management capabilities; many new categories had gross margins far lower than the core nut business, dragging down overall profitability.
  • Post-IPO, the company was overly dependent on the Tmall channel. When traffic dividends faded, the failure to timely pivot to new channels like Douyin led to a stall in online growth.
  • Between 2020 and 2022, quality control issues persisted under the OEM model, continuously damaging brand trust and forcing Zhang to admit that the 'first success was just luck'.

关键成功要素

  • In 2012, the company precisely captured the Taobao Double 11 traffic window, using 7.6 million RMB in first-day sales to validate the feasibility of online branding for the nut category.
  • The anthropomorphic squirrel IP and 'Owner Culture' customer service scripts built an emotional connection distinct from white-label nuts, creating a mental barrier in the unbranded nut sector.
  • The post-IPO failure of the thousand-store offline expansion due to poor site selection and operational capability proved the organizational gap in extending a pure online brand DNA to offline channels.
  • The 2023 supply chain transformation—shifting from OEM to self-built nut factories—was a fundamental strategic correction to address food safety crises and improve gross margins.
  • The 2024 entry into the discount snack track, benchmarking against brands like 'Snack is Busy', uses a low-price, high-frequency strategy to capture lower-tier markets, marking a strategic shift from a brand-premium route to a supply-chain-efficiency route.
  • The 2024 push for a secondary Hong Kong listing and full investment in short-video live-streaming e-commerce marks Three Squirrels' transition from traditional shelf e-commerce to content e-commerce as its second growth curve.

Lessons

  • Success during a traffic dividend period cannot be equated to core competitiveness; Zhang's self-assessment that 'the first success was all luck' shows that entrepreneurs must distinguish between platform dividends and their own capabilities.
  • The asset-light OEM model is a fundamental risk in the zero-tolerance food safety snack industry; self-built factories are heavy but necessary, as quality control costs will eventually be lower than the cost of rebuilding brand trust.
  • When pure online brands expand offline, organizational DNA differences are significant; site selection and store operation capabilities cannot be quickly bridged by capital, and aggressive expansion only amplifies losses.
  • Multi-category expansion must be bounded by supply chain capabilities; extending categories beyond management complexity dilutes brand positioning and drags down core business profitability.
  • Single-channel dependency is a ticking time bomb at any stage; multi-channel layout from Tmall to Douyin and offline must be an active choice, not a passive pursuit.
  • The core competitiveness of the discount snack track is supply chain efficiency and store density, not brand premium; the success of Three Squirrels' pivot depends on whether it can restructure its cost model rather than reusing existing brand assets.

Core Data

  • 2024 Revenue:Approximately 10 billion RMB or more, returning to the 10 billion revenue level after several years (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2022 Revenue:Approximately 7.29 billion RMB, a significant decline from the 2020 peak of approximately 9.8 billion RMB (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2014 Revenue:Approximately 1.1 billion RMB, breaking the billion-level mark for the first time (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • Peak Market Cap:Approximately 20 billion RMB, reached after consecutive daily limit increases following the July 2019 listing (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • IPO Issue Price:14.68 RMB/share, listed on the Shenzhen ChiNext board on July 12, 2019 (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • Stock Code:300783 (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • Total Early Financing:Accumulated over 300 million RMB, covering multiple rounds from angel to Series C (based on public data, independent verification not performed)
  • First Double 11 Sales:7.6 million RMB, achieved in the launch year of 2012 (based on public data, independent verification not performed)

Competitors / Peers

Three Squirrels' main competitors in the nut e-commerce track include Bestore, Be & Cheery, and ChaCha Food. Bestore's omni-channel revenue once exceeded 10 billion RMB after its 2020 Shanghai Stock Exchange listing, but it also faces pressure from fading online traffic dividends and the impact of discount snack retail. Be & Cheery was acquired by Haoxiangni in 2016 and subsequently by PepsiCo, completing an international capital exit path. ChaCha Food excels in offline channels and has deep supply chain roots in the nut and roasted seed sector. In the discount snack track, Three Squirrels faces fiercer competitors, including the massive entity formed by the merger of 'Snack is Busy' and 'Zhao Yiming Snack', as well as 'Hao Xiang Lai' under the Wanchen Group. These rivals capture lower-tier markets with extreme low prices and dense store networks, creating a direct conflict with Three Squirrels' brand-premium DNA.