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Nayuki: The Rise and Fall of the First 'New Tea' Stock from HK$34 Billion to Penny Stock

Founded: Peng Xin (born 1986, Shenzhen), Zhao Lin (Peng Xin's husband) · Nayuki Holdings Ltd.

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther

Origin

In November 2015, Peng Xin opened the first store in Shenzhen, naming it after her online handle, 'Nayuki'. The brand was founded with the vision of helping consumers appreciate and inherit Chinese tea culture, positioning itself as a premium brand with a 100% direct-operation model, aiming to be the 'Starbucks of new tea'. The '150-300 sqm large store + tea + bakery' third-space model impressed consumers and investors, with Zhao Lin managing capital operations. The couple's venture quickly gained favor with investors, completing 7 rounds of financing between February 2017 and June 2021, and entering the HKEX as the 'first new tea stock'.

Milestones

2015
First store in Shenzhen Growth
In November 2015, Peng Xin opened the first store in Shenzhen under her online name 'Nayuki', positioning it as premium new-style tea and insisting on a 100% direct-operation model. The early slogan 'A sip of good tea, a bite of soft European bread' created market differentiation, sparked a trend for soft European bread in the bakery industry, and established it as an early internet-famous brand.
2017
Capital favor Growth
From February 2017 to June 2021, Nayuki secured 7 rounds of financing. According to Tianyancha, it was backed by numerous renowned institutions, becoming the most favored brand in the new tea sector. By 2021, it prepared for an IPO with a high average ticket price of 43 yuan and a scale of 1,068 stores, becoming the largest direct-operated brand in the industry.
2021
HKEX Listing Growth
On June 30, 2021, Nayuki listed on the HKEX, raising net proceeds of HK$4.842 billion. The founders' net worth approached HK$19.4 billion. On the first day of trading, its market cap reached HK$34 billion, making it the only listed company in the new tea industry and driving total industry financing to a peak of 14 billion yuan that year.
2021
Food safety scandal Failure
On August 2, 2021, Beijing market regulators discovered food safety issues at Nayuki stores, including the use of rotten fruit. Two stores were fined 100,000 yuan each, and two store managers were fined 250,000 and 280,000 yuan respectively. A total of 1,811 stores were inspected in Beijing and Guangdong, with 50 ordered to rectify and 23 cases filed, just two months after the IPO.
2022
De-Japanization Turning point
In November 2022, Nayuki changed its Japanese-style logo from '奈雪の茶' to '奈雪的茶', and changed its English branding from the Japanese-style 'NAYUKI' to the Pinyin 'NAIXUE'. It also invested 525 million yuan to become the largest shareholder of Lelecha, attempting to break its deadlock after accumulating over 5.3 billion yuan in losses since 2018.
2023
Opening for franchising Inflection point
In July 2023, Nayuki opened for franchising with what was called the strictest partnership program in the industry, requiring 1.5 million yuan in liquid asset verification for single-store cooperation and 4.5 million yuan for regional cooperation. However, the high-investment large-store model contradicted the industry trend of light-asset small-store franchising, causing it to miss the first wave of franchise growth and leading franchisees to vote with their feet.
2024
Widening losses Failure
In 2024, Nayuki's net loss widened to 926 million yuan. The franchise policy was forced to drop from 1.5 million to 580,000 yuan, yet it remained far above the industry average. Lelecha, affected by the major shareholder's strategic shift, closed over 130 stores and pivoted to a light-asset model, dragging down Nayuki. The average ticket price dropped from its peak of 43 yuan to 24 yuan, nearly halving.
2025
Store contraction Failure
In 2025, Nayuki's revenue was 4.331 billion yuan, down 12% year-on-year, with two consecutive years of losses. Stores shrank from 1,798 to 1,646, a net closure of 152. Franchise stores only grew from 345 to 358, a net increase of 13 for the year. Compared to Guming's net increase of 3,640 and HEYTEA's (Hushang Aiyi) 2,273, it fell behind and exited the top-tier competition.
2026
New concept testing Turning point
In March 2026, Nayuki opened its first 'Xian-Studio' in Shenzhen, launching a low-GI, high-fiber series. The brand name was simplified from 'Nayuki's Tea' to 'Nayuki', and the Pinyin logo changed from NAIXUE to Naisnow. However, the stock price fell from its historical high of HK$18.98 to HK$0.8, with market cap dropping below HK$1.5 billion, an evaporation of over 95% from the peak; the new narrative failed to impress investors.

Turning Points

  • Listed in June 2021 as the first new tea stock with a market cap of HK$34 billion, driving the industry's peak financing of 14 billion yuan and becoming a benchmark for industry capitalization.
  • The food safety scandal involving rotten fruit just two months after listing marked the first major pitfall, triggering a long decline from peak to penny stock.
  • The 2022 de-Japanization, rebranding, and 525 million yuan investment in Lelecha marked a shift from a direct-operation benchmark to a capital-driven M&A expansion model.
  • The July 2023 franchise launch with a 1.5 million yuan verification threshold was the strictest in history, running counter to the industry's light-asset trend and causing it to miss the initial franchise boom.
  • The 2022 full-scale launch of PRO stores, which cut down on on-site baking areas, sacrificed the 'freshly baked' differentiation for cost, causing the core identity to fade.
  • The March 2026 simplification to 'Nayuki' and the introduction of the 'Naisnow' logo exposed the brand's wavering positioning due to frequent name and logo changes.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • The August 2021 rotten fruit food safety scandal occurred just two months after listing; two stores were fined 100,000 yuan, and two managers were fined 250,000 and 280,000 yuan.
  • Accumulated losses exceeded 5.3 billion yuan from pre-listing in 2018 to 2025, highlighting the failure of the core premium model compared to Mixue Bingcheng's nearly 3 billion yuan profit over three years.
  • In 2024, net losses widened to 926 million yuan; the triple pressure of high rent, high labor costs, and high wastage of short-shelf-life bakery products was never effectively resolved.
  • Franchise strategy dropped from 1.5 million to 580,000 yuan but remained far above industry averages; with only 13 net new franchise stores, it lost its appeal in an industry expanding by hundreds or thousands.
  • In 2025, 152 net stores were closed, shrinking from 1,798 to 1,646, exiting the top-tier race and leaving investors with a 95% loss that cannot be recovered.
  • Lelecha, under major shareholder Nayuki's strategic shift, closed over 130 stores; the closure of its last direct-operated store in Beijing marked the marriage turning from hope to a burden.
  • Bakery product revenue share dropped from 10.7% in 2024 to 8.1% (352 million yuan) in 2025, as the core differentiated product line quietly fades.

关键成功要素

  • The premium positioning and 'third space' concept successfully built Nayuki's brand equity between 2015 and 2020, becoming the benchmark for early internet-famous milk tea.
  • The dual-category differentiation of tea and soft European bread made Nayuki the only brand in the new tea sector to successfully execute this model, driving the industry's soft bread craze.
  • Founder Peng Xin naming the brand after her online handle provided a personal label and storytelling element, creating a natural content library for platforms like Weibo and Xiaohongshu.
  • In June 2021, it broke the stereotype that 'secondary markets don't value milk tea' by IPOing as the first new tea stock, igniting the industry's capital climax.
  • The 2022 move to capture the 'Guochao' (national trend) by removing Japanese labels and strengthening Chinese elements successfully gained recognition among specific consumer groups.

Lessons

  • The 100% direct-operated premium large-store model is effective for storytelling but fails to scale—the triple shackles of high rent, labor, and short-shelf-life wastage devour profits.
  • Listing is not the finish line but a magnified test—Nayuki had 7 rounds of financing and high valuation, but the first food safety pitfall showed that primary market valuations don't translate to the secondary market.
  • Franchising is not a life-saving anchor but a time-sensitive tool—the 525 million yuan acquisition of Lelecha and subsequent closure of 130 Lelecha stores proved that blind following of trends is dangerous.
  • Price wars to trade price for volume may not solve fundamental problems—the average ticket price dropped from 43 yuan to 24.4 yuan, nearly halving, yet revenue decline remains unreversed.
  • Frequent wavering in brand positioning is a major taboo—changing names from 'Nayuki's Tea' to 'Nayuki' and 'Naisnow' twice exposed strategic confusion.
  • Closing stores is a self-negation for a company—the closure of 152 direct-operated stores in 2025 and contraction in core cities signal the shrinking space for the premium model.

Core Data

  • 2025 Revenue：4.331 billion yuan (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2025 Net Loss：239 million yuan (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2024 Net Loss：926 million yuan (public data, not independently verified)
  • IPO Peak Market Cap：HK$34 billion (public data, not independently verified)
  • March 2026 Market Cap：Less than HK$1.5 billion (public data, not independently verified)
  • IPO Peak Stock Price：HK$18.98 (public data, not independently verified)
  • March 2026 Stock Price：HK$0.8 (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2025 Total Store Count：1,646 (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2025 Net Store Closures：152 (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2025 Franchise Store Count：358 (public data, not independently verified)
  • IPO Net Proceeds：HK$4.842 billion (public data, not independently verified)
  • Founder Peak Net Worth：HK$19.4 billion (public data, not independently verified)
  • 2025 Average Ticket Price：24.4 yuan (public data, not independently verified)
  • Early Peak Average Ticket Price：43 yuan (public data, not independently verified)
  • Cumulative Losses 2018-2025：Over 5.3 billion yuan (public data, not independently verified)

Competitors / Peers

Competition in the new tea sector has entered a phase where the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker. Mixue Group's 2025 revenue was 33.56 billion yuan with a net profit of 5.88 billion yuan, up 32.7%, with over 36,000 stores, setting the benchmark for industry efficiency. Guming's 2025 revenue was 12.914 billion yuan, up 46.9%, with a net profit of 3.109 billion yuan, up 110.3%, and over 13,000 stores with a net increase of 3,640. ChaBaiDao's revenue was 5.395 billion yuan, up 10%, with a net profit of 820 million yuan, up 71%. Hushang Aiyi had a net increase of 2,273 stores. In contrast, Nayuki's revenue of 4.331 billion yuan fell 12%, and its scale of 1,646 stores is only 12% of Guming's; it is the only long-term loss-making brand among top-tier new tea players and has completely exited the top-tier ranks.

Sources

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⚠️ This entry draws on self-reported accounts and public reporting, not independently verified, and is not investment, startup, or legal advice; revenue figures are case-specific and not representative of typical results.