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Juewei Duck Neck: Dai Wenjun's Franchise-Driven Expansion to 10,000 Stores, Now Facing ST Status After Disclosure Violations and Seeking a Second Growth Curve

Founded: Dai Wenjun (Chairman and General Manager, former Marketing Manager at Qianjin Pharmacy) · Juewei Food Co., Ltd. (SSE: 603517.SH, referred to as ST Juewei)

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOffline

Origin

Before founding Juewei, Dai Wenjun worked at a health supplement company and later as a marketing manager at the established Hunan pharmaceutical firm Qianjin Pharmacy, where he gained experience in channel and terminal management. He identified the braised duck neck category on the streets of Changsha: low unit price, high repurchase rate, ready-to-eat, and heavily reliant on fresh displays at street-side stalls, while Zhou Hei Ya and Huangshanghuang had already established themselves in Wuhan and Nanchang. In 2005, he tested his business model with a small shop in Changsha, and in 2006, he officially founded Juewei Duck Neck, adopting a strategy of rapid expansion through franchising and betting on the fresh braised snack segment, which had been overlooked by traditional snack giants.

Milestones

2005
Changsha Launch PMF
Dai Wenjun first opened a small braised duck neck shop in Changsha to validate the model. In 2006, he officially registered Changsha Juewei Xuan Enterprise Management Co., Ltd. and founded the Juewei Duck Neck brand. He deliberately avoided the Wuhan and Nanchang strongholds of Zhou Hei Ya and Huangshanghuang, choosing Changsha as his starting point. He bet on franchising rather than direct operation, using low-threshold franchise fees to attract individuals to quickly replicate terminal stores, turning fresh braised food stalls into a standardized small business. This phase lasted from 2005 to 2006.
2007
Franchise Sprint Growth
Juewei expanded nationwide using a franchise model. By 2009, the number of stores exceeded 2,000, far surpassing the scale of Zhou Hei Ya's direct-operated stores at the time. The fresh, bulk-weighed sales method lowered the unit price threshold, and high-traffic street-side locations combined with the ready-to-eat attribute formed a high-frequency repurchase model. The short payback period for franchisees further drove the self-replication of the franchise network. This phase lasted from 2007 to 2010.
2011
Capital Entry Turning Point
In 2011, a consortium formed by Fosun Group and Kunwu Jiuding Investment invested 260 million RMB (approx. 40 million USD) in Juewei, a rare large-scale equity investment in the braised snack sector at the time. The capital provided ammunition for Juewei's subsequent supply chain construction and capacity expansion, and indirectly pushed the company toward the capital market.
2017
Vulgar Advertising Penalty Failure
During the Double 11 shopping festival, Juewei's Tmall flagship store released a cartoon poster featuring a woman in underwear with her legs spread and wearing shackles, accompanied by the caption 'Want it? Fresh and juicy.' It was widely criticized for being vulgar and objectifying women. On December 22 of that year, the Changsha Administration for Industry and Commerce issued an administrative penalty to Changsha Juewei Food Marketing Co., Ltd., ordering it to stop publishing illegal advertisements and fining it 600,000 RMB. Juewei issued a public apology on Weibo, marking the first major damage to its brand reputation.
2017
SSE Listing Growth
In 2017, Juewei Food was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (stock code 603517), with IPO proceeds primarily used for capacity expansion. The listing further amplified the leverage of franchise expansion. The company's store count exceeded 10,000 in 2019, becoming the largest braised snack chain brand in China by store count. Revenue and net profit attributable to shareholders continued to grow, reaching a historical peak in 2021 with 6.549 billion RMB in revenue and 981 million RMB in net profit.
2018
Ecosystem Investment Failure
Dai Wenjun proposed integrating excellent domestic catering and food chain enterprises to build a 'food ecosystem.' From 2017 to the first half of 2024, the total cash paid by Juewei for investments reached 8.959 billion RMB, while the total net profit for the same period was only 4.499 billion RMB. From 2022 to the first half of 2024, investment losses totaled 213 million RMB, with many invested catering and braised food companies yet to turn a profit. Jiangsu Manguan and Changsha Nayun lost 8.39 million RMB and 11.72 million RMB respectively in the first half of 2024. The SSE issued two inquiry letters regarding the consecutive investment losses. This phase lasted from 2018 to 2024.
2020
Macau Food Safety Incident Failure
In Macau, 10 people developed symptoms including fever, diarrhea, and headaches after eating duck necks, duck gizzards, and duck tongues sold by Juewei. The Macau Municipal Affairs Bureau ordered the branch in Horta e Costa to temporarily suspend operations and required employees to complete a food safety management course. This was the first public food safety incident in Juewei's fresh braised food supply chain for cross-border stores, exposing the weakness of food safety control in remote franchise stores.
2020
High-Level Cashing Out Turning Point
Between September 2020 and July 2021, when the stock price was near its peak, the actual controller Dai Wenjun completed two rounds of secondary market share reductions through four companies he controlled, cashing out a total of 3.749 billion RMB. On February 18, 2021, the stock price peaked at 107.88 RMB. Two years later, the stock entered a multi-year downward channel, closing at 13.14 RMB on April 24, 2026, a drop of about 90% from its peak. The timing of the high-level cashing out later became a focal point for market skepticism regarding the controller's confidence. This phase lasted from 2020 to 2021.
2023
Store Closures and Decline Failure
Traditional casual braised snacks were hit by shifting consumer demand, leading to a clear industry-wide trend of store closures. Juewei's store count continued to shrink from 14,969 at the end of June 2024. It saw a net closure of 2,114 stores in 2024 and 2,263 in 2025. By April 2026, there were approximately 10,272 stores, a net reduction of 5,678 from the end of 2023. Revenue in the first half of 2024 fell 9.73% year-on-year, and in the first half of 2025, revenue was 2.82 billion RMB, down 15.57% year-on-year, with net profit attributable to shareholders of 175 million RMB, down 40.71%. This phase lasted from 2023 to 2024.
2025
ST Labeling Failure
On June 7, 2024, the CSRC decided to file a case against Juewei Food. On August 15, the company announced the investigation, and the stock price hit the daily limit down. It was found that from 2017 to 2021, the company failed to recognize revenue from franchise store renovation services, leading to an underreporting of revenue in annual reports. The five-year cumulative underreporting was about 724 million RMB, accounting for 1.64% to 5.48% of annual revenue. On September 22, 2025, the company was suspended for the full day, and upon resumption on September 23, it was subject to other risk warnings (ST Juewei), with a 5% daily price limit. The company was fined 4 million RMB, Dai Wenjun was fined 2 million RMB, CFO Peng Caigang was fined 1.5 million RMB, and Board Secretary Peng Gangyi was fined 1 million RMB.
2025
First Loss Since Listing Failure
The annual report disclosed on April 23 showed that 2025 revenue was 5.467 billion RMB, down 12.62% year-on-year, and net profit attributable to shareholders was a loss of 191 million RMB, down 184.11% year-on-year, the first annual loss since listing in 2017. The main reason for the loss was the payment of 297 million RMB in back taxes and late fees. Excluding non-recurring items, net profit was 75 million RMB, still down 62.82% year-on-year. In Q1 2026, revenue was 1.265 billion RMB, down 15.71% year-on-year, and net profit attributable to shareholders was 71 million RMB, down 40.53%.
2025
Plus Transformation PMF
Facing the decline of the traditional street-side stall model, Juewei launched a new store format, 'Juewei Plus,' positioning it as a new-style braised snack shop exploring a dine-in model. The product structure expanded to nearly 30 SKUs, including fried snacks, desserts, grilled staples, and alcoholic beverages, attempting to upgrade from a grab-and-go street stall to a social-friendly casual snack space. Simultaneously, marketing focus shifted from offline to online, increasing investment in Douyin, Meituan, and Xiaohongshu, and hiring brand ambassadors for the first time.

Turning Points

  • In 2006, choosing franchising over direct operation to quickly replicate terminal stores with a low threshold. This strategic choice allowed Juewei to crush Zhou Hei Ya in store count for a long time, but also planted the seeds for uncontrollable management radius.
  • In 2011, the 260 million RMB capital injection from Fosun and Jiuding pushed a street-side braised food shop onto a capitalization path. Listing leverage amplified expansion speed but also governance risks.
  • After listing in 2017, Dai Wenjun proposed the 'food ecosystem' strategy, trading 8.9 billion RMB in investment portfolios for a catering map, but years of losses ended up devouring the profits of the core business.
  • In September 2025, the disclosure violation was confirmed, and the company was labeled ST. The 'King of Braised Snacks' fell from a scale myth to a negative textbook on governance. In 2026, it is betting on the 'Juewei Plus' dine-in format and overseas expansion for a second growth curve.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • In 2017, a 600,000 RMB fine for vulgar advertising during Double 11 caused the first major damage to brand reputation, exposing the weak compliance review of marketing materials at the headquarters of franchise-based enterprises.
  • The 2020 Macau food safety incident showed weak quality control in the fresh braised food supply chain for cross-border stores, requiring employees to take food safety management courses.
  • The food ecosystem investment strategy saw cumulative investment expenditures of 8.959 billion RMB from 2017 to the first half of 2024, far exceeding the total net profit of 4.499 billion RMB for the same period. Investment returns have been in consecutive loss since 2022, totaling 213 million RMB, with many invested companies yet to turn a profit.
  • From the filing of the case in June 2024 to the ST labeling in September 2025, the disclosure violation of underreporting 724 million RMB in revenue over five years was confirmed. The company was fined 4 million RMB, Dai Wenjun was fined 2 million RMB, and the stock price has fallen about 90% from its 2021 peak.
  • Net closure of over 5,000 stores in two years, the first loss of 191 million RMB since listing in 2025 (down 184% year-on-year), and double declines in revenue and profit in Q1 2026. The growth narrative of the traditional street-side franchise braised food model has essentially collapsed.
  • Dai Wenjun cashed out 3.749 billion RMB at the stock price peak between 2020 and 2021. Combined with the subsequent penalties for performance fraud, market confidence has been damaged for the long term.
  • In the first half of 2024, the progress of capacity expansion projects funded by IPO proceeds was only 30% and 46%. Due to weakening industry demand, the planned expansion of 65,700 tons and 25,000 tons of capacity was forced to slow down, missing the window of opportunity.

关键成功要素

  • The franchise model combined with low-threshold unit replication was the core reason Juewei's store count long crushed Zhou Hei Ya's direct-operation model. At its peak in 2021, 15,950 stores formed the densest braised food terminal network in the country.
  • The fresh, bulk-weighed sales method pushed the unit price to an extremely low level. Combined with the ready-to-eat attribute of high-traffic street-side stalls, it formed a high-frequency repurchase single-store model. The short payback period for franchisees supported the self-replication of the network.
  • Vertical integration of the supply chain, with self-built regional capacity bases like Guangdong A-Hua and Guangxi A-Xiu, reduced unit costs, while daily cold-chain delivery ensured daily operations for fresh food stores.
  • Establishing a presence in the upstream duck neck supply chain in Shaanxi and Henan and using weight-based pricing created a differentiated competitive barrier against Zhou Hei Ya's high-priced, locked-fresh packaging model.
  • The transformation starting in 2025, featuring the 'Juewei Plus' dine-in format, online marketing on Douyin/Meituan/Xiaohongshu, and brand ambassadors, is a second attempt to upgrade from street-side stalls to casual snack spaces.

Lessons

  • Once the franchise sprint reaches a certain scale, the headquarters' management radius exceeds the self-cleaning capacity of franchisees. Dai Wenjun, as the supervisor aware of the renovation business, allowed five years of revenue underreporting, showing that governance debt brought by scale grows faster than revenue.
  • Using an investment ecosystem to hedge against the ceiling of the core business is a double-edged sword. The 8.9 billion RMB investment scale exceeded the total net profit for the same period, and loss-making years eroded the financial statements. The risk exposure of scattered bets in the catering sector far exceeds the core business itself.
  • The actual controller cashing out 3.7 billion RMB at the stock peak occurred simultaneously with the subsequent 2 million RMB fine for disclosure violations. Once capital market trust is overdrawn, it takes years and hundreds of millions in back taxes to stop the loss. The cost of governance far exceeds the gains from cashing out.
  • After the dividends of street-side fresh braised food stalls peaked, the dual impact of category aging (young people eating fewer duck necks) and channel changes (discount snack stores squeezing the market) made the transformation window narrow and the cost of trial and error high. Whether the 'Juewei Plus' store upgrade can succeed remains unknown.

Core Data

  • 2009 store count：Over 2,000 (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2011 investment amount：260 million RMB, approx. 40 million USD (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2017-2019 net profit growth：39 million to 152 million RMB growth (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2017-2021 underreported revenue：Approx. 724 million RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2017-2024 H1 investment expenditure：8.959 billion RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2019 store count milestone：10,000 (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2020-2021 Dai Wenjun cash out：3.749 billion RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2021 peak store count：15,950 (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2021 peak net profit：981 million RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2021 peak stock price：107.88 RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2021 peak revenue：6.549 billion RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2022-2024 H1 investment loss：213 million RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2024 H1 revenue：3.34 billion RMB, down 9.73% YoY (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • End of June 2024 stores：14,969 (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2025 H1 revenue：2.82 billion RMB, down 15.57% YoY (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2025 annual revenue：5.467 billion RMB, down 12.62% YoY (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • 2025 net profit：Loss of 191 million RMB, down 184% YoY (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • April 2026 market cap：Approx. 8 billion RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • April 2026 store count：Approx. 10,272 (public data, independent verification not performed)
  • Cumulative fines：Company 4 million RMB, Dai Wenjun 2 million RMB (public data, independent verification not performed)

Competitors / Peers

Zhou Hei Ya (1458.HK) follows a mid-to-high-end route with locked-fresh packaging and direct-operated stores, with 2025 revenue of 2.526 billion RMB and net profit of 157 million RMB (slight growth). Huangshanghuang (002695.SZ) focuses on casual braised snacks in Jiangxi, with 2025 revenue of 1.684 billion RMB (down about 5% YoY) and net profit of 81.59 million RMB. Ziyan Foods (603057.SH) enters the family dining scene with meal-accompaniment braised snacks, with 2025 revenue of 3.363 billion RMB and net profit of 236 million RMB. All three peers are profitable, while Juewei became the only loss-making listed braised snack company in 2025. The discount snack sector (Wanchen Group, formed by the merger of Snacks Busy and Zhao Yiming) is also squeezing traditional fresh braised food stalls at the channel level.

Sources

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⚠️ This entry draws on self-reported accounts and public reporting, not independently verified, and is not investment, startup, or legal advice; revenue figures are case-specific and not representative of typical results.