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Guming: Starting from a Zhejiang County to Become a 10,000-Store Tea Chain via Cold Chain and Regional Density, Now Sprinting Toward a HKEX IPO

Founded: Wang Yunan · Guming Technology Group Co., Ltd.

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFood & Beverage
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther

Origin

Founder Wang Yunan, a native of Wenling, Taizhou, Zhejiang, chose to open a milk tea shop in his hometown of Daxi Town after graduation instead of joining the civil service or a large corporation. Around 2010, the fresh-made tea market in county-level areas was virtually non-existent; consumers could only buy bottled drinks or simple street-side milk tea. Wang identified a demand for consumption upgrades in county markets coupled with a lack of quality supply. He decided to start with a single store, standardize the product, and then replicate the model in surrounding towns, emphasizing product freshness and cold chain logistics—a strategy considered too capital-intensive by peers at the time.

Milestones

2010
Initial Launch Failure
In 2010, Wang Yunan opened the first Guming milk tea shop in Daxi Town, Wenling, Zhejiang. Initially, it had only a few counters and a limited product range. With daily sales under 1,000 yuan and a remote location with low foot traffic, the store suffered heavy losses in the first month and nearly closed. Wang considered giving up, but ultimately decided to adjust the product mix and store location to persist.
2011
Early Exploration Failure
Store expansion was slow for the first three years. Wang and his team experimented with various product combinations and supply channels. Due to the lack of a stable raw material supply chain, quality control was inconsistent, leading to customer churn. Repeated changes to recipes and suppliers failed to solve the spoilage issues of fresh milk and fruit in county-level logistics. During this period, from 2011 to 2013, the company lost tens of thousands of yuan due to large-scale waste of spoiled ingredients.
2014
Regional Density Turning Point
In 2014, Guming began opening stores densely in Daxi Town and surrounding areas. By opening three or four stores in a single town to achieve saturated coverage, it became difficult for competitors to enter. This regional density strategy significantly reduced logistics costs per town and improved brand exposure efficiency. The store count expanded rapidly from single digits to dozens, and the company moved beyond Wenling to replicate the model across Taizhou.
2016
Self-built Cold Chain Pivot
In 2016, Guming decided to build its own cold chain logistics system rather than relying on third parties. It established pre-warehousing and a delivery fleet in Zhejiang to transport fresh fruit and dairy to town-level stores every two days. It was one of the first brands in the industry to build a large-scale cold chain. The massive investment occupied significant cash flow, leading to heated debates within management over whether to continue.
2018
Inter-provincial Expansion Growth
In 2018, Guming expanded from Zhejiang into Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, and other provinces. The total number of stores exceeded 1,000, and the regional density model was successfully replicated across multiple provinces. Annual revenue surpassed the 1 billion yuan mark, and the franchisee profit model began to work. The brand gradually built a reputation in lower-tier markets, though inter-provincial management challenges surged, leading to losses and closures in some regions.
2021
Surpassing 10,000 Stores (Scale) PMF
It took only about three years for Guming to grow from 500 to 5,000 stores. By the end of 2021, it exceeded 6,000 stores. With products priced in the 10-20 yuan range, it precisely targeted the county-level market. The combination of regional density and a two-day delivery supply chain created a positive flywheel effect, cementing Guming's position in the mid-range fresh tea track.
2023
Revenue Exceeds 10 Billion Growth
In 2023, Guming's GMV exceeded 19 billion yuan, with revenue of approximately 12.9 billion yuan. The store count surpassed 9,000, covering 17 provinces nationwide, with over 9,000 franchisees. The gross margin was about 31%, and net profit exceeded 2 billion yuan, making Guming the second-largest fresh tea brand in China after Mixue Bingcheng.
2024
Filing Prospectus Pivot
In 2024, Guming officially filed for a mainboard listing on the HKEX. The prospectus disclosed 2023 annual revenue of 13.6 billion yuan, a net profit of approximately 1.9 billion yuan, 9,066 stores, and about 9,000 franchisees. The company plans to use the proceeds for supply chain construction and store network expansion, though the long HKEX approval cycle makes the listing timeline uncertain.

Turning Points

  • In 2014, abandoning the 'scattershot' strategy in favor of dense store openings in a single town and its surroundings; this regional density model became the foundation for all subsequent expansion.
  • In 2016, building a self-owned cold chain logistics system despite internal management disagreement. This heavy asset investment was seen as extremely costly by peers at the time but later became Guming's core moat.
  • In 2021, positioning products clearly in the 10-20 yuan range, avoiding the low-price segment of Mixue Bingcheng and the high-end segment of Heytea, finding a gap in the mid-range lower-tier market.
  • In 2024, filing the HKEX prospectus marked Guming's transition from a regional chain to a public company, requiring the company to deliver growth to investors based on its heavy supply chain investment logic.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • In 2010, the first store's remote location led to daily sales of less than 1,000 yuan in the first month, nearly causing bankruptcy and forcing the team to consider changing industries.
  • From 2011 to 2013, the lack of a stable supply chain caused frequent spoilage of fresh milk and fruit, and repeated supplier changes failed to resolve quality control issues.
  • During early inter-provincial expansion, management failures led to widespread losses and store closures among franchisees in some regions, forcing the company to retreat to its core provinces.
  • In 2024, the prolonged approval process after the initial HKEX filing, coupled with intensified industry competition and slowing store growth, led to cooling valuation expectations for the tea sector in the capital market.

关键成功要素

  • Regional density model: Opening 3-4 stores in one town to achieve saturation before moving to the next, optimizing logistics costs and brand efficiency simultaneously.
  • Self-built cold chain with two-day delivery: Ensuring quality control for fresh fruit and dairy in town-level stores, serving as Guming's most significant moat compared to peers.
  • 10-20 yuan pricing: Precisely targeting the county-level purchasing power, creating a quality gap with Mixue Bingcheng and a price advantage over Heytea.
  • Strict franchisee selection: Favoring individuals with local resources and operational capabilities, with management depth (including inventory and menu planning) far exceeding industry averages.
  • R&D strategy: Launching 40-50 new products annually but keeping only a few hits on the permanent menu, managing supply chain complexity through high turnover while maintaining menu freshness.

Lessons

  • Heavy-asset supply chains may seem to drag on cash flow early on, but they are the most solid barrier for brands in lower-tier markets; light-asset models collapse once a quality control crisis hits.
  • Regional density is more efficient than nationwide coverage; saturating one province before replicating to neighbors avoids the loss of control caused by excessive logistics and management radii.
  • Mid-range pricing has the largest consumer base in lower-tier markets but requires quality support; low prices alone cannot compete with the economies of scale of Mixue Bingcheng.
  • Franchisee management must be deep and hands-on rather than just collecting fees; Guming's intensive management of inventory and menu planning is the reason for its high survival rate.
  • An IPO is not the finish line but a new testing ground; there is a gap between the capital market's valuation models for the tea sector and the growth stories founders tell using supply chain narratives.

Core Data

  • 2023 Revenue：13.6 billion yuan (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • 2023 Net Profit：1.9 billion yuan (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • Early 2024 Store Count：9,066 (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • Mid 2024 Store Count：13,554 (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • Gross Margin：Approx. 31% (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • 2023 GMV：Over 19 billion yuan (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • Cumulative Historical Financing：Approx. 2 billion yuan (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)
  • Founder's Net Worth：Approx. 20 billion yuan (Company disclosure, as of 2026, unaudited/unverified)

Competitors / Peers

Guming's most direct competitor in the mid-range fresh tea track is ChaPanda, which also uses a franchise model with an overlapping 10-20 yuan price range. ChaPanda has about 8,000 stores and listed on the HKEX in 2024, though its stock price has suffered significantly. Mixue Bingcheng, with over 30,000 stores and lower prices, is the absolute king of the lower-tier market due to its extreme supply chain cost compression, though its product quality and cold chain depth are inferior to Guming's. Heytea and Nayuki have expanded downward from the high-end market, launching sub-brands to compete in the mid-range segment. Chagee, known for its fresh milk tea, has expanded rapidly over the past two years and has a strong lead in overseas markets. Shanghai Auntie and Sweets (Shuyi) also compete in specific regions as franchise brands. In 2024, at least five tea brands were sprinting toward or had completed HKEX listings, marking the industry's entry into a stock competition phase where regional leaders' moats are being squeezed by national top-tier brands.

Sources

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⚠️ This entry draws on self-reported accounts and public reporting, not independently verified, and is not investment, startup, or legal advice; revenue figures are case-specific and not representative of typical results.