Gunjo · Business Intelligence for the AI Era
← Sticker Wall JOURNEY · DETAIL

MINISO: From a 10-Yuan Store to a Global Empire of 10,000 Stores – The Japanese Persona Disguise and Overseas Comeback of an IP Retail Giant

Founded: Ye Guofu (Founder, Chairman, and CEO), Yang Yunyun (Co-founder and Group Vice President) · MINISO Group Holding Limited

JOURNEY

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryContent / Creator Economy
RegionChina
ScaleGiant
ChannelOther

Origin

As early as the 2010s, Ye Guofu ran a successful grocery franchise model with his 10-yuan discount store Aiyaya in South China, discovering that young consumers were willing to pay a premium for packaging and design appeal. In 2013, he founded MINISO in a Guangzhou underground garage. Initially entering the market endorsed by a Japanese design team, it focused on high-frequency store visits and Japanese-style daily goods in the 10 to 30 yuan price range, attempting to combine the Yiwu supply chain with Japanese, American, and Korean IP licensing to replicate Uniqlo's affordable consumption upgrade model.

Milestones

2013
Inception Period PMF
MINISO's predecessor, Mingchuang Youpin, was established in the underground garage of the Hexing Plaza employee village in Liwan District, Guangzhou, with the first batch of stores operating as direct-sales outlets. Ye Guofu transferred his previous 10-yuan store experience from Aiyaya, introducing a diverse SKU strategy and using Japanese-style cute packaging and low-priced entry-level items to drive traffic. The model achieved an average monthly revenue of about 200,000 to 300,000 RMB per store, opening dozens of locations in its first year.
2015
Rapid Expansion Period Growth
In 2015, the first overseas store opened in Singapore, kicking off its global expansion, followed by rapid penetration into Asia-Pacific markets such as Malaysia, Sydney, and Hong Kong. In 2017, it even attempted to enter the North Korean market with a store on Kwangbok Street in Pyongyang—a decision that later turned into a major PR disaster. UN Security Council Resolution 2321 prohibited trade with North Korea, and facing international pressure, the Japanese branch quickly distanced itself, announcing that the store was an individual action by the Chinese side and unrelated to the Japanese business. The store was eventually closed and renamed Evolution. This phase lasted from 2015 to 2017.
2018
Financing & Listing Period Turning Point
In 2018, it secured 1 billion RMB in strategic investment from Tencent and Hillhouse Capital, breaking the 10 billion RMB valuation threshold for the first time. However, at the end of the same year, its Canadian subsidiary filed for bankruptcy protection, and operations were taken back by MINISO China in 2019. In 2019, a collaboration with Marvel precisely captured the IP consumption psychology of Generation Z. In October 2020, it went public on the New York Stock Exchange (stock code: MNSO), becoming one of the few Chinese consumer companies to defy the market trend and IPO post-pandemic. This phase lasted from 2018 to 2020.
2022
De-Japanization Rectification Transition
Years of accumulated skepticism completely erupted in July 2022 when a Spanish social media account mislabeled a cheongsam doll as a Japanese geisha, triggering a massive public opinion storm over its 'Japanese disguise.' Ye Guofu publicly issued an apology statement, announcing that by the end of March 2023, all global stores would complete a unified rectification from Japanese-style decor to Chinese-red brand colors, Chinese music, and Chinese shopping bags. In June of the same year, it completed a secondary listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising approximately $116 million. In September 2024, it spent about 624 million RMB to make a tender offer for a 29.4% stake in Yonghui Superstores, becoming one of China's largest supermarket integration transactions. In 2025, it expanded into licensed IP merchandise from Disneyland and Harry Potter. This phase lasted from 2022 to 2025.
2026
IP Retail Empire Growth
In 2026, official disclosures showed that global stores exceeded 7,700 (including about 7,488 under the core MINISO brand, about 4,275 in Mainland China, and about 280 under TOP TOY). FY2025 full-year revenue reached $2.45 billion, with product lines spanning two main categories: IP-designed general merchandise and IP collectible toys. Ye Guofu was named Forbes China Best CEO in 2024, with a personal net worth of approximately $2.2 billion according to the 2024 Hurun Global Rich List. MINISO has become the first domestic Chinese retail brand characterized by modest individual store sizes yet exceptionally prominent global network density and IP licensing breadth.

Turning Points

  • 2018 Tencent and Hillhouse 1 Billion RMB Investment: Upgraded from a regional franchise model to a nationwide reproducible system, with direct-sales and franchising running in parallel to drive revenue.
  • 2022 De-Japanization Crisis: The Spanish geisha incident and persistent skepticism over its Japanese disguise forced Ye Guofu to publicly admit mistakes and overhaul the visual system of global stores, serving as the true turning point for brand independence.
  • 2024 Yonghui Superstores Acquisition: Acquired a 29.4% stake for 624 million RMB, extending the reach of its retail network from neighborhood groceries to fresh food supermarket supply chains, attempting to use retail-supplier integration to counter pure e-commerce diversion.

Failures & Pitfalls

  • Japanese Disguise Eventually Exposed: Ye Guofu registered a shell company in Japan and fabricated endorsements by Japanese designer Junya Miyake for nearly a decade, which media outlets questioned as having no verifiable records. Historical controversies—such as the removal of Japanese flags and bans on playing Chinese music in Western Asia and Spain—ultimately triggered a consumer trust crisis.
  • Pyongyang Store Debacle: Opening a MINISO store in Pyongyang, North Korea in April 2017 violated UN Security Council sanctions. The Japanese branch quickly cut ties, causing the brand to hurriedly rename itself Evolution. This attempt, launched under the gimmick of the Belt and Road Initiative, ended in failure.
  • Canadian Subsidiary Bankruptcy: In 2018, MINISO Canada filed for bankruptcy protection, exposing the overseas franchise system's shortcomings in local compliance and cash flow management, until operations were taken over and restarted by the Chinese headquarters in 2019.

关键成功要素

  • Extreme SKU Density and Low Unit Price Strategy: The 10 to 30 yuan price range combined with high-frequency new product rollouts makes in-store repurchase rates far higher than typical general stores. The franchise model enables rapid replication while the headquarters strictly controls pricing.
  • IP Licensing-Driven Differentiation: Starting with Marvel in 2019 and expanding to Disney, Sanrio, Harry Potter, Detective Conan, and One Piece by 2025, turning exclusive licensed co-brandings into a moat that ordinary Yiwu cross-border e-commerce players cannot replicate.
  • Dual-Wheel Globalization and Localization: Beyond its mega-store home market of China, it adopts a hybrid franchise and direct-sales approach across North America, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and South America, with local social media uniformly controlled by headquarters to avoid fake-Japanese-brand controversies.
  • Using high-frequency new arrivals and low unit prices to turn stores into traffic entry points, and then relying on IP co-brandings to increase average transaction value and repurchases.

Lessons

  • Brand narrative cannot rely on pseudo-nationality as a long-term crutch: Short-term curiosity premiums may be gained, but once exposed, the entire logic of IP consumer products gets dragged back to origin doubts. The de-Japanization overhaul took nearly a year to patch the wound in trust.
  • Supply chain advantages of a 10-yuan store do not equal strength in fresh food: Although the Yonghui acquisition allows MINISO to gain access to fresh ingredients and cold chain networks, fresh food spoilage and the long-term competitive logic of supermarkets differ vastly from IP general merchandise, placing integration risks under a multi-year test period.
  • Overseas expansion must not treat political risk as a marketing story: The Pyongyang store seemed to generate traffic and buzz, but in reality exposed a weak grasp of international sanction rules, magnifying the brand's compliance vulnerabilities and making repair costs extremely high.
  • Supply chain efficiency determines whether stores can offer low prices with high quality, but once brand trust is damaged due to identity narratives, it takes years to repair.

Core Data

  • Establishment Time:September 2013 (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • 2020 New York Listing:October 2020 (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • 2022 Hong Kong Listing:June 2022 (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • Total Global Stores:Approx. 7,700 (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • FY2025 Revenue:$2.45 billion (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • Yonghui Superstores Shareholding Ratio:29.4% (September 2024) (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • Ye Guofu 2024 Net Worth:Approx. $2.2 billion (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)
  • Membership Count:Over 100 million (Based on public disclosures, independent verification pending)

Competitors / Peers

MINISO's direct competitors include peers in the same weight class of affordable variety store chains like MINISO itself (Muji, which has a Japanese design style but a high-end positioning with nearly 5x price differences), dollar-store chains like Five Below in the US and Poundland in the UK, as well as domestic Chinese emerging beauty collection stores like Nǒme Home and KKV that also rely on IP licensing and high cost-effectiveness for differentiation. On the overseas front, the European and North American markets are dominated by long-standing discount variety stores like Dollar General and Daiso, though they severely lack China's IP supply chain, while Southeast Asia features local IP-licensed retailers in Vietnam and Malaysia entering the market with low prices.