Cross-Chain Bridge Phishing via Fake Security Audit Platforms: Inducing Authorization to Steal Assets
Victims are typically active traders holding multi-chain assets and operators of small-to-medium DeFi projects who have limited technical knowledge of cross-chain bridges but are eager to enhance asset security. Psychologically, they are susceptible to promises of 'official certification,' 'free audits,' or 'high-yield capital protection.' Lacking vigilance regarding contract authorization risks, they often grant unlimited asset access on suspicious websites.
Key Fields
FIELD STAMPSWho Gets Targeted
Victims are typically active traders holding multi-chain assets and operators of small-to-medium DeFi projects who have limited technical knowledge of cross-chain bridges but are eager to enhance asset security. Psychologically, they are susceptible to promises of 'official certification,' 'free audits,' or 'high-yield capital protection.' Lacking vigilance regarding contract authorization risks, they often grant unlimited asset access on suspicious websites.
骗局怎么运作
- Attackers post advertisements in communities like Telegram and Discord, masquerading as official security audit services. They claim to offer bridge vulnerability detection and free cross-chain transaction quotas, using official logos and look-alike domains to build credibility and creating a sense of urgency through social engineering.
- Once victims click the fake webpage, they are guided to download browser extensions or connect their wallets. A contract call that appears to be a security audit pops up, claiming to only read on-chain status, but it actually calls the bridge contract's authorization function, requesting the user to sign for unlimited transfer permissions.
- After the signature is completed, the attacker uses the obtained authorization to automatically trigger cross-chain transfer scripts in the background, consolidating the victim's assets from multiple chains into an attacker-controlled address. The transfers are executed in high-frequency, small-amount batches to reduce the probability of triggering on-chain monitoring.
- Once assets are moved, attackers immediately use coin mixers, on-chain bridge pools, or centralized exchanges to launder the funds. Victims can only see the authorization records on-chain, making it extremely difficult to recover the transferred tokens.
- After a successful heist, attackers continue to post 'asset recovery' services in the same community, guiding users to authorize again to form a continuous scam chain, sometimes even providing forged recovery reports to obtain secondary authorization.
红旗信号(看到这些快跑)
- 🚩 Promotional materials use exaggerated terms like 'official audit,' 'free security scan,' or 'zero-risk staking,' and the provided links differ from official domains by only one character.
- 🚩 Users are asked to sign contract calls in their wallets that appear to be 'read-only' but are actually granting transfer or bridge contract permissions.
- 🚩 Use of urgent language to pressure users, such as 'limited-time offer' or 'protect your assets immediately,' creating panic regarding potential account theft.
- 🚩 Customer support contact information is limited to private messaging accounts or anonymous groups, lacking official verified phone numbers or email addresses.
- 🚩 Promised returns or fee waivers are inconsistent with industry standards, and no verifiable audit reports or security certifications are provided.
真实案例
- In September 2023, a victim was scammed on Telegram into authorizing a fake Verus cross-chain bridge security audit contract, resulting in the loss of approximately $750,000 USDC. See Gate News (2023-09-15) for the report.
- In June 2024, a victim clicked on a fake AFX Bridge security scan page. After signing, assets were bulk-transferred to the attacker's address, totaling approximately $24 million USDC. See the Cryptonomist report (2024-07-31).
- In March 2025, a DeFi project operator fell for a phishing email claiming 'XRP cross-chain bridge reserves drained.' After authorizing, approximately 99.7% of their XRP reserves were drained, resulting in a loss of about $12 million. See the BlockWeeks report (2025-03-20).
Official Stance
- 2023-12-01: Gate.com published 'Cross-Chain Bridge Authorization Scam Case Warning,' advising users not to trust unfamiliar authorization links.
- 2024-02-15: CertiK issued a security audit risk alert in its blog 'Verus Incident Analysis,' noting that fake audit services are often accompanied by authorization scams.
- 2025-08-20: Trustformer.info published 'Zero-Risk Staking Authorization Scam Warning,' exposing typical phishing techniques and providing prevention guidelines.
How to Protect Yourself
- ✅ On any webpage or plugin from an unknown source, always check the contract call method to ensure it only reads status and does not involve transfers or authorizations.
- ✅ Only download wallet plugins or browser extensions from official channels, use official URLs, and verify SSL certificates via browser security locks.
- ✅ Double-confirm all authorization requests, use hardware wallets or offline signing, and verify on a blockchain explorer whether the contract address is the official bridge contract.
- ✅ Enable maximum authorization limits in your wallet, grant only the minimum necessary amount, and regularly audit the list of authorized contracts to revoke unnecessary permissions.
- https://cn.cryptonomist.ch/2026/07/31/afx%E6%A1%A5%E6%94%BB%E5%87%BB%E8%BF%BD%E5%9B%9E%EF%BC%9A%E6%9C%9D%E9%B2%9C%E9%80%9A%E8%BF%87%E8%99%9A%E5%81%87%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E9%82%80%E7%BA%A6%E7%9B%97%E5%8F%962400%E4%B8%87%E7%BE%8E%E5%85%83/
- https://blockweeks.com/news/299612
- https://www.trustformer.info/zh/s-articles/article867
- https://www.certik.com/zh-CN/blog/verus-incident-analysis