Gunjo · Business Intelligence for the AI Era
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The eZuobao Ponzi Scheme: 74.5 Billion Yuan Raised via Fictitious Projects, 900,000 Investors Still Seeking Recovery After a Decade

The victims were primarily middle-aged and elderly investors, with media reports indicating that about 90% were retirees, alongside a large number of working-class individuals and self-employed people new to internet finance. They were generally misled by signals such as 'state-owned background,' 'CCTV advertisements,' and '14.6% annualized returns.' They were vulnerable due to greed for high interest, blind faith in brand endorsements, and a lack of understanding of P2P underlying assets. Many invested their pensions, relocation compensation, or even borrowed money. After the collapse, they lost everything, with some families falling into crises such as divorce or inability to afford medical care for severe illnesses. Even after a decade, the recovery process remains incomplete.

SCAM

Key Fields

FIELD STAMPS
IndustryFintech
RegionChina(中国大陆(总部北京,覆盖全国))
ScaleGray Market
ChannelOther
⚠️ This entry compiles scam tactics and public reporting; it is not investment or legal advice. Content is organized from public reporting and third-party complaint platforms; this site does not make any finding of illegality against the parties involved, who may contact us for correction if they object. If you encounter fraud, report it to the police immediately (110 / anti-fraud hotline 96110 in mainland China; local police overseas).

Who Gets Targeted

The victims were primarily middle-aged and elderly investors, with media reports indicating that about 90% were retirees, alongside a large number of working-class individuals and self-employed people new to internet finance. They were generally misled by signals such as 'state-owned background,' 'CCTV advertisements,' and '14.6% annualized returns.' They were vulnerable due to greed for high interest, blind faith in brand endorsements, and a lack of understanding of P2P underlying assets. Many invested their pensions, relocation compensation, or even borrowed money. After the collapse, they lost everything, with some families falling into crises such as divorce or inability to afford medical care for severe illnesses. Even after a decade, the recovery process remains incomplete.

骗局怎么运作

  • Fabricating endorsements to build trust: Ding Ning spent heavily to rent office space in Beijing's core business district and assembled a sales force of over 10,000. By using CCTV ads, subway advertisements, and celebrity endorsements, he created an image of a legitimate 'state-owned' enterprise. Investment managers used a standardized script: 'We are as safe as a bank, but with double the returns,' leading investors to believe their funds were as secure as bank deposits.
  • Creating fictitious projects: Over 95% of the platform's financing lease projects were forged. Operations staff used randomly sourced corporate photos, photoshopped documents, and hastily assembled contracts to fabricate borrowing projects. The backend system allowed for the arbitrary modification of project data, and investors could not find the corresponding borrowing companies in the industrial and commercial registration system, making it impossible to verify the authenticity of the underlying assets.
  • Luring with high-yield scripts: Investment managers used '9%-14.6% annualized returns,' 'principal protection,' and 'on-demand withdrawals' as bait. They repeatedly emphasized 'limited quotas' and 'miss it and wait another year,' encouraging investors to pour their pensions and savings into the platform. This converted strangers into full-scale users and induced existing clients to recruit friends and family.
  • Self-financing via a capital pool: Investors' money went directly into private accounts controlled by Ding Ning through associated payment channels, forming a Ponzi-style capital pool where 'new money pays old interest.' The so-called loan projects were merely a front for withdrawing cash. The platform never generated any real operating cash flow; all interest payments came from the principal of subsequent investors.
  • Squandering and asset transfer: The raised funds were used to purchase luxury cars worth tens of millions, dozens of properties, and luxury goods. Media reports even suggested they bought out entire brand stores. Meanwhile, they used high 'guaranteed returns' to bribe associates and transferred assets through shell companies to prepare for hiding funds after the collapse.
  • Bank run and collapse: In December 2015, Beijing police raided the platform, and withdrawals were immediately suspended. 900,000 investors discovered that all their projects were fictitious. By the time police seized the accounts, most funds had been squandered or transferred. The recovered assets represented only a small fraction of the total amount raised, and most investors have yet to recover their principal.

红旗信号(看到这些快跑)

  • 🚩 Abnormally high returns: Annualized returns of 9%-14.6% far exceeded the average for bank wealth management and the P2P industry at the time. Furthermore, promises of guaranteed principal and interest with 'on-demand withdrawals' are red flags, as legitimate financial intermediaries do not make such rigid payment guarantees.
  • 🚩 Non-transparent projects: Borrowing targets had only vague photos and summaries. Searching the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System yielded no corresponding companies, or the companies had been established for only a few months—severely inconsistent with the claimed 'large-scale financing lease business.'
  • 🚩 Advertising bombardment and lack of transparency: Despite massive CCTV ads, celebrity endorsements, and subway posters, the platform never disclosed key operational data such as fund custodian banks, default rates, or lists of borrowing companies. The focus was entirely on brand image rather than business details.
  • 🚩 Abnormal collection accounts: Investors paid into third-party payment platforms or accounts associated with the company rather than dedicated bank custodian accounts. Once transferred, the funds were outside regulatory oversight and could be misappropriated at will.
  • 🚩 Withdrawal delays and aggressive promotions: In the months before the collapse, withdrawals slowed down, with customer service blaming 'system upgrades' or 'financial audits.' Simultaneously, the platform increased interest rates and offered gifts to attract new capital—a classic sign of a Ponzi scheme nearing collapse.

真实案例

  • In December 2015, Beijing police launched an investigation into eZuobao, and founder Ding Ning and others were arrested. Xinhua News Agency later reported that the platform had raised over 50 billion yuan, with 95% of projects being fictitious, involving over 900,000 investors nationwide. (Source: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250402A07NI000)
  • In August 2016, the eZuobao case was transferred to the procuratorate for prosecution, with Ding Ning and 11 others charged with fundraising fraud. The Supreme People's Procuratorate disclosed that the platform illegally raised over 74.5 billion yuan, affecting over 900,000 people, making it the largest online illegal fundraising case in China at the time. (Source: https://www.jiemian.com/article/627665.html)
  • In April 2025, media outlets including Tencent News reported that eZuobao had initiated a second round of fund liquidation. Nearly a decade after the case, registered investors have received partial refunds, but most have not recovered their full principal, and the recovery process continues. (Source: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250402A07NI000)

Official Stance

  • December 2015: Beijing public security authorities launched an investigation into eZuobao for suspected illegal absorption of public deposits. Official notices urged investors to register their claims, the platform's website was seized, and withdrawal channels were closed.
  • August 2016: The Beijing People's Procuratorate accepted the eZuobao case for prosecution, holding Ding Ning and 11 others criminally liable for fundraising fraud. The Supreme People's Procuratorate disclosed that the case involved over 74.5 billion yuan and more than 900,000 people.
  • 2016 to 2017: The Supreme People's Procuratorate disclosed details of the eZuobao illegal fundraising case to the public, clarifying the nature of the Ponzi scheme involving fake projects and self-financing, providing a cautionary example for national internet finance risk rectification.

How to Protect Yourself

  • ✅ Perform due diligence before investing: Log into the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, enter the full names of the platform and the borrowing companies, and check industrial and commercial registrations, paid-in capital, affiliated companies, and administrative penalty records. If a connection between the platform and the borrower is found, withdraw immediately.
  • ✅ Check against the 'yield red line': Be highly vigilant if annualized returns exceed 6%-8%. Promises of 'zero risk, high returns' with guaranteed principal and interest are essentially illegal fundraising. Refuse such offers and report them to the local financial bureau.
  • ✅ Confirm bank custody: Legitimate online lending funds should be held in dedicated bank custodian accounts. The payment recipient should be a bank, not the platform or a third-party payment company. Verify the custody relationship through the bank's customer service and refuse to transfer money to personal accounts.
  • ✅ Retain evidence and report promptly: If withdrawal delays occur, immediately save contracts, transaction records, and chat logs. Call 110 or report to the local public security economic investigation department. Follow court announcements and official liquidation notices to participate in debt declaration and registration according to the law.