Mingming Henmang: Snacks Busy and Zhaoyiming Merge to Hit 30,000 Stores in Two Years and Sprint for HKEX IPO
Founded: Yan Zhou, Zhao Yiming · Mingming Henmang Group (formerly Snacks Busy, formed by the merger of Snacks Busy and Zhaoyiming Snacks)
Key Fields
FIELD STAMPSOrigin
In 2017, Yan Zhou, a catering entrepreneur from Changsha's Carbon River Ancient Town, noticed traditional snack shops had markup rates as high as 40% to 50%, while county-level youth consumption upgrades were ignored by Tier 1 and Tier 2 brands. He decided to target the Tier 3 and Tier 4 sinking markets using an extreme cost-performance discount model. Meanwhile, Zhao Yiming started from Yichun, Jiangxi, running a roasted-nut stall and food agency, and opened the first Zhaoyiming Snacks in 2019, lowering terminal prices by cutting out middlemen through direct manufacturer sourcing. Both paths converged on the same destination, betting on the sinking market's demand for snacks with extreme price sensitivity, low brand loyalty, but high repurchase frequency, ultimately merging under capital promotion to band together against the Wanchen faction.
Milestones
Turning Points
- In November 2023, Snacks Busy and Zhaoyiming Snacks merged, ending close-quarters combat in the border areas of Hunan and Jiangxi. Post-merger, the group's store count leaped to over 6,500, making it the track leader in scale.
- Post-merger procurement systems were integrated, reducing procurement costs for some categories by about 8% to 12%. However, independent front-end operations for the two brands caused the headquarters administrative expense ratio to rise from about 2% to about 3.5%.
- After rebranding to Mingming Henmang in 2024, net store openings exceeded 10,000 for the year, pushing total stores past 15,000. However, average daily single-store sales dropped from about 10,000 RMB to about 7,000 RMB, as scale dividends and single-store dilution occurred simultaneously.
- In 2025, it filed with the HKEX to sprint for an IPO, disclosing a store count exceeding 20,000, though net franchise store openings in some provinces turned negative for the first time, pivoting the industry from a scale race to quality-efficiency cultivation.
Failures & Pitfalls
- In the early merger stage, the procurement systems, franchisee management standards, and store SOPs of the two brands were independent, taking nearly a year to integrate. This caused the headquarters administrative expense ratio in the first half of 2024 to rise from about 2% to about 3.5%, eating into some procurement synergy gains brought by the merger.
- After a net increase of over 10,000 stores throughout 2024, average daily single-store sales dropped from about 10,000 RMB pre-merger to about 7,000 RMB, extending the franchisee payback period from about 10 months to over 14 months. Regions like Henan and Anhui experienced collective franchisee store closures or brand-switching to join Wanchen's Haoxianglai.
- Following the opening of its first store in 2019, Zhaoyiming Snacks suffered a loss of nearly 50,000 RMB in its first month due to weak supply chain bargaining power and procurement prices for a batch of goods over 10% higher than peers. The team was forced to pivot to regional brand direct sourcing and bulk white-label combinations to stop the bleeding.
- Early on, Snacks Busy's first store in Changsha followed traditional snack shop high-markup product selection logic, resulting in daily sales of less than 3,000 RMB and continuous losses for half a year in the first few months, only hitting a turning point after cutting high-markup imported categories to focus on sinking price bands.
关键成功要素
- The core barrier in value snacks is not store count but procurement concentration. Integrating procurement after Mingming Henmang's merger reduced procurement costs for some categories by about 8% to 12%, which is the key to truly converting scale into profit.
- Sinking markets are extremely price-sensitive with low brand loyalty. A product selection structure mixing white-label bulk items with branded snacks runs the single-store model better than pure brands; controlling customer unit prices within the 10 to 15 RMB range is a prerequisite for repurchases.
- The franchise model is a double-edged sword during the scale-racing period. A net increase of over 10,000 stores brought a revenue surge of about 60%, but average daily single-store sales dropped from about 10,000 RMB to about 7,000 RMB, and the dilution effect began to backfire before the IPO.
- After forming a dual-strong landscape with Wanchen Group's Haoxianglai, franchise subsidies and deposit price-war tactics compressed gross margins for both sides from about 18% to about 15%, making quality-efficiency cultivation rather than scale sprinting the survival rule for 2026.
Lessons
- A merger is only the starting point. The time cost of integrating procurement and IT systems was far higher than expected; Mingming Henmang took nearly a year post-merger to connect the backend, with the administrative expense ratio rising by about 1.5 percentage points—bundling up does not equal immediate cost reduction.
- Scale dividends have a ceiling. Once the store count exceeded 15,000, average daily single-store sales dropped by about 30% and payback periods extended by over four months; blindly pursuing a 10,000-store scale will backfire on franchisee survival rates.
- The value-snack track is not winner-take-all but a dual-strong standoff. Mutual squeezing between Mingming Henmang and Wanchen's Haoxianglai has pressed industry gross margins from about 18% down to about 15%; whoever is first to successfully run the single-store model via quality-efficiency cultivation will capture the bottom-price dividend.
- Franchisees are not numbers but cash flow nodes. Net store openings turning negative in some provinces is a more dangerous signal than a decline in revenue; once store-closure waves spread, they will shake the foundation of IPO valuations.
Core Data
- 合并时门店数:About 6,500 stores (November 2023) (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 2024年末门店数:About 15,000 stores (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 2025年中门店数:Over 20,000 stores (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 2024年营收:About 26 billion RMB (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 2024年净利润:About 630 million RMB, up about 130% year-on-year (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 2025年上半年营收:About 15 billion RMB (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 单店日均销售额:Dropped from about 10,000 RMB pre-merger to about 7,000 RMB (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 加盟商回本周期:Extended from about 10 months to over 14 months (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 合并后部分品类进货成本降幅:About 8%-12% (Public data source, independent review not verified)
- 总部管理费用率:Rose from about 2% to about 3.5% (Public data source, independent review not verified)
Competitors / Peers
Mingming Henmang's core rival in the value-snack track is Haoxianglai, owned by Wanchen Group. Haoxianglai went public on the A-share market via a backdoor listing through Wanchen Biotechnology in 2024, growing its store count from several thousand to over 10,000 within two years, forming a dual-strong landscape with Mingming Henmang. Both sides engage in close-quarters combat in core sinking regions like Henan, Anhui, and Hunan, using franchise subsidies and deposit reductions to poach franchisees. In addition, regional players like Snacks Youming, Tangchao, and Dai Yonghong still maintain thousands of stores in their respective provinces, but under the squeeze of the two giants, most choose to be acquired or contract, and the window for third-tier players is rapidly narrowing. The focus of competition in 2026 has shifted from store count to single-store output and supply chain efficiency.