AI Customer Service ‘Operational Error’ Refund Scam — Stealing Verification Code Screenshots to Fraudulently Charge Credit Cards

Who Gets Targeted

The main victims are middle-aged and elderly people unfamiliar with mobile payments, along with post-80s to post-00s frequent online shoppers who are used to following instructions from “official customer service.” Such people are easily led by scripts like “system deduction failed” or “membership was mistakenly activated,” readily trust the caller's claimed official identity, and do not understand that SMS verification codes are equivalent to financial passwords. Sending a screenshot casually to “customer service” is like handing the key to their bank card to a scammer. According to Xinhua News Agency, in similar cases handled by the Jinchuan Branch of the Jinchang Municipal Public Security Bureau, victims exceeded 20, mostly elderly, with individual losses ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan, and total involved amount over 3 million yuan (Gansu Province Jinchang Municipal Public Security Bureau Jinchuan Branch, 2026-04-28 notification).

骗局怎么运作

• Step 1: The black industry obtains e-commerce order information through data leaks or phishing links, then uses AI voice synthesis to mimic the store customer service representative's original voice and calls the victim via caller ID spoofing, accurately stating the recipient, product, and amount, instantly lowering their guard.
• Step 2: The AI customer service claims that a “system operational error” mistakenly set the victim as an auto-debit member, deducting several hundred yuan per month; or claims the refund process failed and needs to be redone, demanding the victim act immediately, otherwise the funds will be permanently frozen. The script is urgent and leaves no room for negotiation.
• Step 3: The victim is guided to add the “after-sales customer service” on QQ or WeChat, download a fake app called “UnionPay Center” or “Claims Platform,” or enter a counterfeit refund webpage. These interfaces are almost identical to official ones, but all data entered is transmitted to the scammers in real time.
• Step 4: After the victim enters the bank card number and password, the page prompts “verification failed.” The customer service asks the victim to screenshot the SMS verification code received on the phone and send it for “manual verification,” or to enable phone screen sharing, letting the scammer directly see every dynamic verification code.
• Step 5: The scammer uses the obtained verification codes to bind third-party payments, withdraw cash, or make purchases, with single transactions ranging from several thousand to hundreds of thousands of yuan. Once successful, they immediately block the victim and cut off all contact. The funds are transferred through multiple layers of accounts, making recovery extremely difficult.

红旗信号（看到这些快跑）

• 🚩 The calling number is a personal mobile phone or an overseas number. The caller claims to be official customer service but cannot provide an employee ID, and no corresponding service record can be found in the official app.
• 🚩 They proactively request a “refund” or “cancellation,” but the precondition is providing an SMS verification code, bank card CVV, or enabling screen sharing. Legitimate customer service would never ask for these.
• 🚩 They ask you to join a QQ group, WeChat group, or download a non-official app. The page domain differs from the official website by only one letter, or uses a free subdomain.
• 🚩 The script creates strong time pressure, such as “if you don't handle it now, you'll be charged tonight” or “the refund cannot be processed after the deadline,” and does not allow you to hang up and think.
• 🚩 They direct you to withdraw cash from a lending platform and transfer it back to “customer service,” or ask you to enter your payment password—this is a typical closed-loop signal of fraud.

真实案例

• In April 2026, the Xinhuanet client published an investigative report: a woman in a certain place received a call from someone claiming to be customer service of an e-commerce platform. The caller accurately stated her historical orders and said a “platinum membership” had been mistakenly activated and needed to be cancelled. The caller then guided her to enable screen sharing and operate her bank card, and tens of thousands of yuan were transferred out in multiple transactions.
• In July 2026, according to public reports, an online store encountered 9 AI impersonation refund scams within three months. Scammers impersonated store customer service, called buyers, and, on the pretext of a “refund operational error,” asked for screenshots of verification codes. Multiple buyers lost tens of thousands of yuan in total, and the merchant closed down after receiving a large number of complaints.
• In August 2026, Huai'an police released a case: the victim received a “education refund” customer service call, believed it, and followed instructions to use mobile password-free payment and loans. The victim had intended to recover a 210 yuan refund but instead had 260,000 yuan transferred away. After police intervened, some funds were successfully stopped, but most had already been transferred.
• In August 2026, Beijing Radio and Television Station reported a telecom network fraud case announced by Beijing Tongzhou police: the victim received a call from someone claiming to be customer service of an e-commerce platform and was induced to download a Trojan app called “抖正惠”. The program could remotely control the phone, steal SMS verification codes, and enable password-free payment, directly withdrawing funds from the card. Police dismantled a black-industry gang hiding in three cities that provided tools to overseas fraud groups. (Source: http://www.52hrtt.com/beining/n/w/info/G1786947467515)
• In August 2026, Huai'an police released an education-refund AI customer service fraud case: after receiving an “education refund” customer service call, the victim followed instructions to use mobile password-free payment and loans, and 260,000 yuan was transferred away; after police intervened, some funds were successfully stopped, but most had already been transferred. (Source: http://www.52hrtt.com/beining/n/w/info/G1786947467515)

Official Stance

• Xinhua News Agency, 2026-04-28, published “Xinhua Investigation | Beware of AI ‘Customer Service’ Phone Scams” (Source: https://app.xinhuanet.com/news/article.html?articleId=20260428c066cd56a743461e9255ade41611154e)
• State Administration for Market Regulation (Standardization Administration of China), 2026-05-25, issued “Customer Contact Service—Requirements for Collaboration Between Human and Intelligent Customer Service” (GB/T 47746—2026) (Source: https://openstd.samr.gov.cn/bzgk/std/newGbInfo?hcno=0E87FFCB90EF54C0F997F7DF9AE52FC0)

How to Protect Yourself

• ✅ If you receive a call claiming to be customer service, hang up first, and proactively call back to verify through the online customer service in the official app or the official hotline. Do not use any number or link sent by the other party.
• ✅ Remember that a verification code is a financial password. Never tell it to anyone under any circumstances; banks and e-commerce platforms will never ask for a verification code by phone.
• ✅ Set a daily spending limit on bank cards, and disable password-free payment and overseas transactions; for online shopping, use a separate low-limit card and avoid binding the primary credit card to everyday payments.
• ✅ If you accidentally leak a verification code or notice unusual account activity, contact the bank immediately to report the loss and freeze the account. At the same time, keep SMS and call records, dial 96110, or go to a police station to file a report.